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Wireless Password Cracking With Cloud Clusters 
By Sonia Kiparisi 
Prerequisite to read the present paper is to see the movie ELYSIUM.  
Since the late 1990s, Wi-Fi security algorithms have undergone multiple 
 upgrades with outright depreciation of older algorithms and significant revision to 
newer algorithms. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the most widely used Wi-Fi security 
algorithm in the world WEP was ratified as a Wi-Fi security standard in September of 
1999. Despite revisions to the algorithm and an increased key size, over time numerous 
security flaws were discovered in the WEP standard and, as computing power increased, 
it became easier and easier to exploit them. 
Wi-Fi Protected Access was the Wi-Fi Alliance’s direct response and replacement 
to the increasingly apparent vulnerabilities of the WEP standard. It was formally adopted 
in 2003, a year before WEP was officially retired. The most common WPA configuration is 
WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key). The keys used by WPA are 256-bit, a significant increase over 
the 64-bit and 128-bit keys used in the WEP system. WPA has, as of 2006, been officially 
superseded by WPA2. One of the most significant changes between WPA and WPA2 was 
the mandatory use of AES algorithms and the introduction of CCMP (Counter Cipher 
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Mode with Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol) as a replacement for 
TKIP (still preserved in WPA2 as a fallback system and for interoperability with WPA). 
The propose of this thesis is to crack Wireless Encryption Protocols by revealing the 
passwords. Passwords have been the most popular means of authentication for many decades. 
An enterprise employee uses multiple passwords every day in order to use all applications and 
systems provided by his employer. Businesses spend considerable amount of resources in 
order to deploy authentication mechanisms and policies, which are then compromised due to 
password leaks or misuse. While it may be convenient from an end user point of view to use 
passwords, it is very hard for organizations to create, maintain, dispose, and distribute them 
securely. Passwords by nature, introduce many security problems into otherwise sufficiently 
secure architectures. 
Trying to accelerate the time-breaking a wireless network we tested new techniques 
with the use of the advantages of cloud technology. 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous network access to a shared pool 
of configurable computing resources. Cloud computing and storage solutions provide users 
and enterprises with various capabilities to store and process their data in third-party data 
centers.  It relies on sharing of resources to achieve coherence and economies of scale, similar 
to a utility (like the electricity grid) over a network. At the foundation of cloud computing is 
the broader concept of converged infrastructure and shared services [24]. 
So, we decide to make a Cluster of nodes in order to crack Wireless Encryption 
Protocols using the NITOS penetration testbed. Each node is a linux fairly node with Pyrit 
software. We choose Pyrit because Pyrit allows to create massive databases, pre-computing 
part of the IEEE 802.11 WPA/WPA2-PSK authentication phase in a space-time-tradeoff [21]. 
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Fistrly, we use more traditional methods of cracking like airmon –suite. As we note at the 
experiment airmong-suite is a time-satisfactory method as regards WEP and WPA2 Wireless 
Encryption Protocols. Concerning the protocol WPA2 we use Cluster’s  of nodes which use 
WPA2 Wireless Encryption Protocol. Τhen wanting to extend the experiment we did 
comparative tests on the type of cluster but also as regards the number of nodes that it uses. 
We used as parallel as distributed cluster. Also, by adding extra nodes to the distributed 
cluster we studied the reaction of some characteristics as the “Benchmark”, “Network-
Clients”, the “CPU and Memory usage” and mainly the “Time Cracking”. 
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 Επιθέσεις σε Ασύρματα Δίκτυα με τη Χρήση της 
Συστοιχίας Υπολογιστών Cloud 
Σόνια Κυπαρίση 
Προϋπόθεση ανάγνωσης της παρούσας εργασίας είναι να δείτε την ταινία ELYSIUM.  
Από τα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 1990, οι Wi-Fi αλγόριθμοι ασφαλείας έχουν υποστεί 
πολλές αναβαθμίσεις με ολοκληρωτική αναθεώρηση παλαιότερων αλγορίθμων και 
σημαντική αναθεώρηση  νεώτερων αλγόριθμων. Το  Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
πρωτόκολλο είναι η πιο διαδεδομένη Wi-Fi μέθοδος ασφαλείας στον κόσμο από τότε που ο 
WEP επικυρώθηκε ως πρότυπο τον Σεπτέμβριο του 1999. Παρά τις σημαντικές 
αναθεωρήσεις  του αλγόριθμου και την εφαρμογή ενός μεγάλου μεγέθους κλειδιού, με 
πάροδο του χρόνου πολλά κενά ασφαλείας ανακαλύφθηκαν στο  WEP πρότυπο ενώ, καθώς η 
υπολογιστική δύναμη αυξήθηκε, έγινε πιο εύκολο ένας απλός χρήστης να εκμεταλλευτεί τα 
κενά αυτά. 
 Το Wi-Fi Protected Access ήταν η άμεση αντίδραση και ήρθε ως αντικαταστάτης για 
τα όλο και πιο εμφανή τρωτά σημεία του προτύπου WEP. Υιοθετήθηκε επίσημα το 2003, ένα 
χρόνο πριν από ότου το WEP αποσύρθηκε επίσημα. Το WPA περιέχει το WPA-PSK (Pre-
Shared Key). Τα κλειδιά WPA είναι 256-bit, μια σημαντική αύξηση σε σχέση με τα κλειδία 
64-bit και 128-bit που χρησιμοποιεί το σύστημα WEP. Ωστόσο το WPA έχει, από το 2006, 
επίσημα εκτοπιστεί από WPA2. Μία από τις πιο σημαντικές αλλαγές μεταξύ WPA και WPA2 
ήταν η υποχρεωτική χρήση αλγορίθμων AES και την εισαγωγή του CCMP (Counter Cipher 
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Mode) ως αντικατάσταση του TKIP (ακόμα διατηρείται σε WPA2 ως εφεδρικό σύστημα και 
για τη διαλειτουργικότητα του με τοWPA).  
Σκοπός της διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι το σπάσιμο των Wireless Encryption 
Protocols, αποκαλύπτοντας τους κωδικούς πρόσβασης. Οι Κωδικοί πρόσβασης αποτελούν 
έναν από τους πιο δημοφιλής τρόπους ελέγχου ταυτότητας για πολλές δεκαετίες. Υπάλληλος 
επιχείρησης χρησιμοποιεί πολλούς κωδικούς πρόσβασης κάθε μέρα για να χρησιμοποιήσει 
όλες τις εφαρμογές και τα συστήματα που του παρέχονται από τον εργοδότη του. 
Επιχειρήσεις σπαταλούν σημαντικούς  πόρους προκειμένου να αναπτύξουν μηχανισμούς 
ελέγχου ταυτότητας και πολιτικές, οι οποίες στη συνέχεια είναι σε κίνδυνο λόγω διαρροών  
των κωδικών πρόσβασης ή λόγω κακής χρήσης τους. Ενώ μπορεί να είναι βολικό από μια 
άποψη για τον τελικό χρήστη να χρησιμοποιεί κωδικούς πρόσβασης, είναι πολύ δύσκολο όσο 
αφορά σε μια επιχείρηση να δημιουργήσει, να διατηρήσει, να διαθέσει, και να διανέμει τους 
κωδικούς με ασφάλεια. Οι  Κωδικοί πρόσβασης από τη φύση τους, εισάγουν πολλά 
προβλήματα ασφαλείας. 
 Προσπαθώντας να μειώσουμε τον χρόνο «σπασίματος» σε ένα ασύρματο δίκτυο, 
δοκιμάσαμε  νέες τεχνικές με τη χρήση των πλεονεκτημάτων της τεχνολογίας cloud. 
Το cloud computing είναι ένα μοντέλο το οποίο επιτρέπει πρόσβαση σε ένα 
κοινόχρηστο χώρο με διαμορφώσιμους υπολογιστικούς πόρους. Το cloud computing παρέχει 
στους χρήστες και στις επιχειρήσεις διάφορες δυνατότητες ώστε να αποθηκεύουν και να 
επεξεργάζονται τα δεδομένα τους σε κέντρα δεδομένων τρίτων κατασκευαστών. Στηρίζεται 
στην κατανομή των πόρων για την επίτευξη συνοχής, παρόμοια με ένα δίκτυο (όπως το 
δίκτυο ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας). Ο όρος  cloud computing είναι η ευρύτερη έννοια μιας 
υποδομής με συγκλίνουσες και κοινές υπηρεσίες [24]. 
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Συγκεκριμένα, έχουμε αποφασίσει να υλοποιήσουμε ένα σύμπλεγμα κόμβων 
προκειμένου να σπάσουμε ασύρματα πρωτόκολλα κρυπτογράφησης χρησιμοποιώντας το 
testbed εργαστήριο NITOS.  Κάθε κόμβος αποτελείται από ένα linux λογισμικό πάνω στο 
οποίο στήσαμε το Pyrit λογισμικό. Επιλέγουμε τη Pyrit επειδή η Pyrit επιτρέπει την 
δημιουργία τεράστιων βάσεων δεδομένων, προ-υπολογισμένων κάνοντας έλεγχο τύπο 
ταυτότητας IEEE 802.11 WPA/WPA2-PSK [21]. Αρχικά, χρησιμοποιούμε πιο παραδοσιακές 
μεθόδους του σπασίματος όπως η χρήση του airmon-suite. Όπως διαπιστώνουμε στο πείραμα 
το airmong-suite είναι μια ικανοποιητική μέθοδος όσον αφορά το WEP και το WPA 
ασύρματα πρωτόκολλα κρυπτογράφησης. Σχετικά με το πρωτόκολλο WPA2 χρησιμοποιούμε 
cluster από κόμβους που χρησιμοποιούν το πρωτόκολλο κρυπτογράφησης WPA2. Στη 
συνέχεια, επεκτείναμε το πείραμα που κάναμε με συγκριτικές δοκιμές σχετικά με τον τύπο 
cluster, αλλά επίσης όσον αφορά τον αριθμό των κόμβων που αυτό χρησιμοποιεί. 
Χρησιμοποιήσαμε παράλληλα και κατανεμημένα cluster . Επίσης, με την προσθήκη επιπλέον 
κόμβων στο κατανεμημένο σύμπλεγμα μελετήθηκε η αντίδραση του κάποια χαρακτηριστικά 
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Κεφάλαιο 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
The last decade in the field of computer networks has seen many changes, and new 
challenges. A significant number of these can be attributed to the increase in the utilization of 
wireless computer networks globally. Our coffee shops, airports, schools, and even our homes 
often have access to a wireless network of some kind.  
The seeming availability of wireless networks for everyone and anyone is a major 
source of concern for most Network and Security professionals. While wireless networks have 
brought panoply of benefits with them, they have unique safety issues. If sensitive 
information is transmitted over a wireless network, privacy and integrity is a concern and 
must be taken care of. 
There are two types of encryption in Wireless Networks, we have WEP that stands for 
Wireless Equivalency Protocol and we have WPA which stands for Wi-Fi Protected Access. 
WEP requires all clients and access points in the network to share up to four diﬀerent secret 
symmetric keys.  WEP has some major design ﬂaws and was completely broken in 2001 by 
Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir. They showed that an attacker can recover the secret key of the 
network with an average consumer laptop in 1-2 hours. To ﬁx the problems of WEP, a new 
standard named Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) was released in 2003, now part of the IEEE 
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802.11 speciﬁcations. In spite that WPA is more secure than WEP, both are vulnerable to 
different types of attacks as we will see. 
The purpose of this paper is to cracking WEP, WPA and WPA2 protocol by revealing 
the password with particular emphasis on cracking time. Τraditional methods seemed 
satisfactory in terms of breaking the WEP and WPA protocol as opposed to WPA2.  Firstly, 
we use the aircrack-suite in order to reveal the WPA2 password which takes up to 23 minutes! 
Because it is a time-consuming process we decide to make a Cluster of nodes in order to crack 
it. Each node is a linux fairly node with Pyrit software. 
We choose Pyrit because Pyrit allows to create massive databases, pre-computing part 
of the IEEE 802.11 WPA/WPA2-PSK authentication phase in a space-time-tradeoff.  
Exploiting the computational power of Many-Core- and other platforms through ATI-Stream, 
Nvidia CUDA and OpenCL, it is currently by far the most powerful attack against one of the 
world’s most used security-protocols [21].  
That means the use of Cloud technology. Cloud technology gives us large capacity 
and joint management of a database and it also gives us the speed which is multiplied as the 
clients in cluster grow. 
1.2 Motivation  
The act of password cracking has been closely related to the Information Security field 
because passwords were the first means of protecting data and restricting access to it. 
Passwords are still widely used nowadays and remain the most popular way of adding 
security to confidential information. Because of this, there is a wide range of attacks against 
passwords.  
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I am personally involved in various projects related to password cracking amongst 
which some related to distributed password cracking, rainbow table generation and CPU and 
GPU based password cracking. Therefore, the objective of this project is to make a 
penetration testing using the advantages of cloud technology in the cracking field.       
            As we said above the cloud technology gives us two superior advantages. First, 
the large capacity and joint management of a database and secondly the speed which is 
multiplied as the clients in cluster grow. A scenario which may reflect the reality in a few 
years is a public, online service WPA cracking system. In this system users can lend the 
computing power of their systems, creating a “vast-computational” cluster. They can upload 
their dictionary and the corresponding SSID and then the cluster can create almost 
immediately the corresponding PMKs table. So, users by lending the computing power of 
their systems can enjoy access to the colossal cluster which allows them to attack any wpa / 
wpa2 network without special hardware.     
1.3 Structure   
The structure of this thesis is as follows:  
 Chapter2: We give an introduction to the technical details of WEP. Then 
we analyze the attacks on WEP. At last, we use the Nitos testbed to crack 
the WEP protocol. 
 Chapter3: This Chapter analyses the WPA protocol. Next, we compare the 
WEP protocol to WPA protocol. At last, we use the Nitos testbed to crack 
the WPA protocol. 
 Chapter4: In this Chapter we present the WPA2 protocol. Next, we 
compare the WPA protocol to WPA2 protocol. We analyze the attacks 
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against WPA2 protocol. Then we introduce the cloud technology and pyrit 
software . At last, we use the Nitos testbed to crack the WPA2 protocol. 
 Chapter5: In this Chapter we make a Penetration testing in Nitos laboratory. 
We make clusters of CPUs for attacking WPA2 protocol by using PYRIT. 
 Chapter 6: This Chapter makes suggestions for improving security in 
passwords and make a colossal cluster which allows to attack any wpa / 
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Κεφάλαιο 2 WEP  protocol: an overview 
Nowadays, numerous networks are wireless. Either at home or at work, it is necessary 
to encrypt the data transmited on those networks to prevent eavesdropping. One of the most 
common protocol aiming at wireless network security and privacy is the Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) protocol, created in 1999. It is part of the 802.11 standard for wireless LAN 
communications [1]. 
The purpose of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was to provide security comparable 
to that of wired networks. RC4 stream cipher is used by WEP to provide confidentiality and 
CRC-32 for data integrity. The standard specified for WEP provides support for 40 bit key 
only but non standard extensions have been provided by various vendors which provide 
support for key length of 128 and 256 bits as well. A 24 bit value known as initialization 
vector is also used by WEP for initialization of the cryptographic key stream Error! 
Reference source not found..  
In this part, we are going to describe the WEP protocol. However, it soon became 
apparent that due to myriad flaws, WEP's privacy was not at all equivalent to that of a wired 
network. Therefore, it wasn't long before a new technology debuted to address many of 
WEP's shortcomings. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
6 
2.1 Protocol Encryption 
The construction of the WEP MPDU (MAC Protocol Data Unit) consists of three 
main parts: The actual message or Data, an Integrity Check Value (ICV) and the Initialization 
Vector (IV). This MPDU is further encapsulated in an 802.11 header. In WEP, only the actual 
message data and the ICV are encrypted. The IV and the 802.11 headers are sent in the clear. 
The 24-bit IV is used in combination with the shared secret key as input to the RC4 
encryption algorithm, and the Key ID subﬁeld indicates which secret key, out of four 
possible, that was used to encrypt the packet. 
A block diagram depicting the WEP encapsulation can be seen in Figure 2-1. Starting 
at the top of the ﬁgure, the IV is added to the beginning of the packet, and also concatenated 
with the WEP Key. This concatenation of the IV and WEP Key is then used to feed the RC4 
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), and produce the pseudorandom key-stream used 
for encryption. 
 
Figure 2-1: WEP encapsulation block diagram. 
The message is ﬁrst put through a CRC-32 algorithm to produce the ICV. The ICV is 
then concatenated to the message. The resulting data is then XORed with the pseudorandom 
key-stream to produce the encrypted ciphertext and added to the ﬁnal WEP packet, this is 
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illustrated in Figure 2-2. The ﬁnal WEP encapsulated packet will then contain the plaintext 
IV, followed by the encrypted message and ICV. 
 
Figure 2-2: WEP encryption using the keystream generated by RC4 XORed with the plaintext. 
2.1.1 Pseudorandom Number Generator - RC4 
WEP makes use of the RC4 pseudorandom number generator for encryption. The RC4 
algorithm is surprisingly simple, and can be easily explained. RC4 operates on a 256-byte 
state vector S, which contains all 256 permutations of 8 bits. This state vector is ﬁrst 
initialized to contain all the values in ascending order. A 256-byte temporary vector is also 
created which contain the key K. If the key is smaller than 256 bytes the key is simply 
repeated until the vector is ﬁlled. This is illustrated in Figure 2-3. This initialization is 
described in Algorithm 1. 
 
Figure 2-3: Pseudorandom Number Generator- Algorithm 1 
The next step is to use the temporary vector, T, to produce an initial permutation of the 
state vector, S. This is done by swapping two bytes in S according to a procedure given by T. 
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Since the only operation done on S is swapping of bytes, S will still contain all permutations 
of eight bits. This is illustrated in Figure 2-4. The algorithm for the initial permutation of S is 
given in Algorithm 2. 
 
Figure 2-4: Pseudorandom Number Generator- Algorithm 2 
When the initial permutation is complete, the key and the temporary vector are never 
used again. The keystream is generated one byte at a time by swapping every byte of S, based 
on its own state. Next, a byte k is selected for the keystream. This is illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
This procedure is given in Algorithm 3. 
 
Figure 2-5: Pseudorandom Number Generator- Algorithm 3 
RC4, and especially the way WEP uses it, has some weaknesses. These weaknesses 
will be discussed in Section 2.2. 
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2.1.2 Authentication 
Before any communication can take place between a station and the network, the 
station needs to authenticate to become associated with the network. WEP supports two types 
of authentication: Open System authentication and Shared Key authentication [16]. The Open 
System authentication is actually a null authentication algorithm [5], which means that any 
STA can authenticate if the AP is set to Open System Authentication. This protocol simply 
consists of a Request and a Success message, and there is no actual authentication taking 
place. 
The Shared Key authentication oﬀers a one-way authentication, as opposed to mutual 
authentication. The STA authenticates with the AP, but the AP never authenticates with the 
STA. Only STAs that know the secret key are able to successfully authenticate with the AP. 
This protocol consists of a four-way handshake, and is initiated by the STA sending an 
Authentication request. A sequence diagram of the authentication can be seen in Figure 2-6. 
The AP will then respond with a challenge, which contains a 128-octet message generated by 
the WEP PRNG. When the STA receives this challenge, the 128-octet is encrypted using 
WEP with the secret shared key and sends this back to the AP. When the AP receives this 
message it is decapsulated and the ICV is checked. If this check is successful, the decrypted 
contents are compared with the challenge previously sent. If these match, the AP knows that 
the STA knows the shared key and sends an authentication success message. 
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Figure 2-6: Sequence diagram of Shared Key Authentication. 
Even though this method of authentication may seem to be more secure than the Open 
System Authentication, it has some severe weaknesses which are described in Section 2.2. 
The Shared Key authentication is deprecated and if WEP (which is also deprecated) is used, 
only Open System authentication should be enabled. 
2.2 Attacks on WEP 
A key recovery attack is the ultimate attack, from which the attacker obtains the 
master key that can be used to gain full access to the network. This section will explain the 
history and detail of the most serious and well-known attacks on the WEP protocol 
2.2.1  Packet injection 
Attack 1 An attacker who has captured an encrypted packet in a WEP network, can 
later reinject this packet, and it will still be accepted by the network. 
Packet injection is sometimes understood as not a real attack on WEP, because WEP 
was never designed to be resistant against such an attack. A packet sent in a WEP protected 
network which has been intercepted by an attacker, can later be injected into the network 
again, as long as the key has not been changed and the original sending station is still in the 
network. If the sending station is not in the network anymore, the senders (and the receivers) 
address can be changed to a station that is still in the network. This is possible, because these 
ﬁelds are not protected by the ICV [5]. 
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2.2.2 Fake authentication 
Attack 2 Fake authentication: An attacker can join a WEP protected network, which 
supports Open System authentication, without knowing the secret root key. An attacker can 
join a WEP protected network, which support Shared Key authentication, if he has captured a 
full Shared Key authentication handshake between a station and an access point. 
The fake authentication attack on the WEP protocol allows an attacker to join a WEP 
protected network, even if the attacker has not got the secret root key. IEEE 802.11 deﬁnes 
two ways a client can authenticate itself in an WEP protected environment. The ﬁrst method 
is called Open System authentication.  Here, a client just sends a message to an access point, 
telling that he wants to join the network using Open System authentication. The access point 
will answer the request with successful, if he allows Open System authentication. As you can 
see, the secret root key is never used during this handshake, allowing an attacker to perform 
this handshake too and to join an WEP protected network without knowledge of the secret 
root key. The second method is called Shared Key authentication. Shared Key authentication 
uses the secret root key and a challenge-response authentication mechanism, which should 
make it more secure (at least in theory) than Open System authentication, which provides no 
kind of security. 
In a Shared Key authentication system, identity is demonstrated by knowledge of a 
shared, secret, WEP encryption key.[CWKS97] 
First, a client sends a frame to an access point telling him, that he wants to join the 
network using Shared Key authentication. The access point answers with a frame containing a 
challenge, a random by testring. The client now answers with a frame containing this 
challenge which must be WEP encrypted. The access point decrypts the frame and if the 
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decrypted challenge matches the challenge he send, then he answers with successful and the 
client is authenticated. An attacker who is able to sniﬀ an Shared Key authentication 
handshake can join the network itself. First note, that besides the APs challenge, all bytes in 
the third frame are constant and therefore known by an attacker. The challenge itself was 
transmitted in cleartext in frame number 2 and is therefore known by the attacker too. The 
attacker can now recover the key stream which was used by WEP to encrypt frame number 3. 
The attacker now knows a key stream and the corresponding IV which is as long as frame 
number 3. The attacker can now initiate an Shared Key authentication handshake with the AP. 
After having received frame number 2, he can construct a valid frame number 3 using his 
recovered key stream. The AP will be able to successfully decrypt and verify the frame and 
respond with successful. The attacker is now authenticated. We will later see that there are 
some more attacks which allow key stream recovery, so that an attacker does not even need to 
sniﬀ a valid handshake to recover an key stream. Additionally, there are possibilities to force 
a station to reauthenticate itself immediately [5]. 
2.2.3 FMS Attack  
Regarding the related key vulnerability, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir devised a method 
of using the weakness of RC4, the keystream generator for WEP, to obtain bits of the root key 
based on probabilities of certain state permutation bits reaching a "resolved state" such that 
they contained a correlation to the first byte of the keystream [6].  
2.2.4 Fragmentation Attack 
The attack begins by intercepting a packet on the network, preferably an ARP packet. 
With regards to a general packet, it can be said that the first 8 bytes of plaintext can be known 
due to a common LLC/SNAP header on each encrypted packet. Since the first 8 bytes of the 
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plaintext is known, it can be XORed with the ciphertext to give 8 bytes of the keystream. For 
the case of an ARP packet, more is known about its format and thus more keystream bits may 
be extracted. The keystream can now be used to encrypt data, although the use of this is 
infeasible when considering that an 8 byte allocation is sectioned into 4 bytes of payload and 
4 bytes of CRC32 checksum. Thus, the attack must utilize the 802.11 feature of packet 
fragmentation to send a protocol maximum of 16 four byte fragments, thus generating a 64 
byte packet for injection. Figure 2-7 illustrates this method [6].   
 
Figure 2-7: Fragmentation Attack diagram  
2.2.5  Chopchop Attack  
In a 2004 posting on netstumbler.org, a person going by the pseudonym of KoreK 
posted an attack, described in greater detail in which utilizes the mathematical structure of the 
CRC32 checksum that is appended to the end of the plaintext payload before encryption. The 
premise of this attack is as follows: assuming the last 4 bytes of the encrypted packet 
comprise the CRC32 checksum, remove the last byte and replace it with a “corrected” guess 
that replicates a valid checksum, then send it off to the access point. If the access point returns 
with an error message, the guess was incorrect and another is made. If the access point returns 
with confirmation, then the final byte has been guessed correctly and is now known to the 
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attacker. This can be extended to the other bits of the checksum as well, providing a partial 
break [6]. 
2.2.6 Caffe Latte attack 
The Caffe Latte attack debunks the age old myth that to crack WEP, the attacker needs 
to be in the RF vicinity of the authorized network, with at least one functional AP up and 
running. We demonstrate that it is possible to retrieve the WEP key from an isolated Client - 
the Client can be on the Moon! - using a new technique called "AP-less WEP Cracking". With 
this discovery Pen-testers will realize that a hacker no longer needs to drive up to a parking lot 
to crack WEP. Corporations still stuck with using WEP, will realize that their WEP keys can 
be cracked while one of their employees is transiting through an airport, having a cup of 
coffee, or is catching some sleep in a hotel room. Interestingly, Caffe Latte also has a great 
impact on the way Honey-pots work today and takes them to the next level of sophistication 
[7]. 
2.3 Aircrack-ng  suite 
Aircrack-ng is an 802.11 WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program that can recover 
keys once enough data packets have been captured. It implements the standard FMS attack 
along with some optimizations like KoreK attacks, as well as the PTW attack, thus making 
the attack much faster compared to other WEP cracking tools. 
In fact, Aircrack-ng is a set of tools for auditing wireless networks. 
2.3.1 Aireplay-ng 
Aireplay-ng is used to inject frames. 
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The primary function is to generate traffic for the later use in aircrack-ng for cracking 
the WEP and WPA-PSK keys. There are different attacks which can cause deauthentications 
for the purpose of capturing WPA handshake data, fake authentications, Interactive packet 
replay, hand-crafted ARP request injection and ARP-request reinjection. With 
the packetforge-ng tool it's possible to create arbitrary frames. 
2.3.1.1 Usage: 
aireplay-ng <options> <replay interface> 
For all the attacks except deauthentication and fake authentication, you may use the 
following filters to limit which packets will be presented to the particular attack. 
2.3.1.2 Filter options: 
 -b bssid : MAC address, Access Point 
 -d dmac : MAC address, Destination 
 -s smac : MAC address, Source 
 -m len : minimum packet length 
 -n len : maximum packet length 
 -u type : frame control, type field 
 -v subt : frame control, subtype field 
 -t tods : frame control, To DS bit 
 -f fromds : frame control, From DS bit 
 -w iswep : frame control, WEP bit [8]. 
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2.3.1.3 Packets injection 
When replaying (injecting) packets, the following options apply. 
 -x nbpps : number of packets per second 
 -p fctrl : set frame control word (hex) 
 -a bssid : set Access Point MAC address 
 -c dmac : set Destination MAC address 
 -h smac : set Source MAC address 
 -e essid : For fakeauth attack or injection test, it sets target AP SSID. This is optional 
when the SSID is not hidden. 
 -j : arpreplay attack : inject FromDS pkts 
 -g value : change ring buffer size (default: 8) 
 -k IP : set destination IP in fragments 
 -l IP : set source IP in fragments 
 -o npckts : number of packets per burst (-1) 
 -q sec : seconds between keep-alives (-1) 
 -y prga : keystream for shared key auth 
2.3.1.4 Attacks modes 
This is how you specify which mode (attack) the program will operate in. 
 - -deauth count : deauthenticate 1 or all stations (-0) 
 - -fakeauth delay : fake authentication with AP (-1) 
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 - -interactive : interactive frame selection (-2) 
 - -arpreplay : standard ARP-request replay (-3) 
 - -chopchop : decrypt/chopchop WEP packet (-4) 
 - -fragment : generates valid keystream (-5)  
 - -test : injection test (-9) [8]. 
2.3.1.5 An Example  
aireplay-ng -1 0 -e teddy -a 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 -h 00:0F:B5:88:AC:82 ath0 
Where: 
 -1 means fake authentication 
 0 reassociation timing in seconds 
 -e teddy is the wireless network name 
 -a 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 is the access point MAC address 
 -h 00:0F:B5:88:AC:82 is our card MAC address 
 ath0 is the wireless interface name [9]. 
Success looks like: 
18:18:20  Sending Authentication Request 
18:18:20  Authentication successful 
18:18:20  Sending Association Request 
18:18:20  Association successful :-) 
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2.3.2 Airmon-ng 
Airmon-ng command can be used to enable monitor mode on wireless interfaces. It 
may also be used to go back from monitor mode to managed mode. 
2.3.2.1 Usage 
usage: airmon-ng <start|stop> <interface> [channel] or airmon-ng <check|check kill> 
Where: 
 <start|stop> indicates if you wish to start or stop the interface. (Mandatory) 
 <interface> specifies the interface. (Mandatory) 
 [channel] optionally set the card to a specific channel [10]. 
2.3.3 Airodump-ng 
Airodump-ng is used for packet capturing of raw 802.11 frames and is particularly 
suitable for collecting WEPIVs (Initialization Vector) for the intent of using them 
with aircrack-ng. If you have a GPS receiver connected to the computer, airodump-ng is 
capable of logging the coordinates of the found access points. 
2.3.3.1 Usage 
usage: airodump-ng <options> <interface>[,<interface>,...] 
2.3.3.2 Options: 
 --ivs : Save only captured IVs 
 --gpsd  : Use GPSd 
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 --write  <prefix> : Dump file prefix 
 -w : same as --write 
 --beacons : Record all beacons in dump file 
 --update <secs> : Display update delay in seconds 
 --showack : Prints ack/cts/rts statistics 
 -h : Hides known stations for --showack 
 -f  <msecs> : Time in ms between hopping channels 
 --berlin <secs> : Time before removing the AP/client from the screen when no 
more packets are received (Default: 120 seconds) 
 -r <file> : Read packets from that file 
2.3.3.3 Filter options: 
 --encrypt   <suite> : Filter APs by cipher suite 
 --netmask <netmask> : Filter APs by mask 
 --bssid     <bssid>: Filter APs by BSSID 
 --essid     <essid> : Filter APs by ESSID 
 --essid-regex <regex> : Filter APs by ESSID using a regular expression 
 -a : Filter unassociated clients 
2.3.3.4 Channels 
By default, airodump-ng hop on 2.4GHz channels. You can make it capture on 
other/specific channel(s) by using: 
 --channel <channels>  : Capture on specific channels 
 --band <abg>          : Band on which airodump-ng should hop 
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 -C    <frequencies>   : Uses these frequencies in MHz to hop 
 --cswitch  <method>   : Set channel switching method 
 0: FIFO (default) 
 1: Round Robin 
 2: Hop on last 
 -s:same as --cswitch 
 
    --help : Displays this usage screen [11]. 
2.3.4 Aircrack-ng 
Aircrack-ng is an 802.11 WEP and WPA/WPA2-PSK key cracking program. 
Aircrack-ng can recover the WEP key once enough encrypted packets have been captured 
with airodump-ng. This part of the aircrack-ng suite determines the WEP key using two 
fundamental methods. The first method is via the PTW approach (Pyshkin, Tews, 
Weinmann). The default cracking method is PTW. This is done in two phases. In the first 
phase, aircrack-ng only uses ARP packets. If the key is not found, then it uses all the packets 
in the capture.  The main advantage of the PTW approach is that very few data packets are 
required to crack the WEP key. The second method is the FMS/KoreK method. The 
FMS/KoreK method incorporates various statistical attacks to discover the WEP key and uses 
these in combination with brute forcing. 
2.3.4.1 Usage 
aircrack-ng [options] <capture file(s)> 
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2.3.4.2 Options 
Option Param. Description 
-a amode Force attack mode (1 = static WEP, 2 = WPA/WPA2-PSK). 
-b bssid Long version –bssid. Select the target network based on the access point's MAC 
address. 
-e essid If set, all IVs from networks with the same ESSID will be used. This option is also 
required for WPA/WPA2-PSK cracking if the ESSID is not broadcasted (hidden). 
-p nbcpu On SMP systems: # of CPU to use. This option is invalid on non-SMP systems. 
-q none Enable quiet mode (no status output until the key is found, or not). 
-c none (WEP cracking) Restrict the search space to alpha-numeric characters only (0x20 - 
0x7F). 
-t none (WEP cracking) Restrict the search space to binary coded decimal hex characters. 
-h none (WEP cracking) Restrict the search space to numeric characters (0x30-0x39) These 
keys are used by default in most Fritz!BOXes. 
-d start (WEP cracking) Long version –debug. Set the beginning of the WEP key (in hex), 
for debugging purposes. 
-m maddr (WEP cracking) MAC address to filter WEP data packets. Alternatively, specify -m 
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff to use all and every IVs, regardless of the network. 
-M number (WEP cracking) Sets the maximum number of ivs to use. 
-n nbits (WEP cracking) Specify the length of the key: 64 for 40-bit WEP, 128 for 104-bit 
WEP, etc. The default value is 128. 
-i index (WEP cracking) Only keep the IVs that have this key index (1 to 4). The default 
behaviour is to ignore the key index. 
-f fudge (WEP cracking) By default, this parameter is set to 2 for 104-bit WEP and to 5 for 
40-bit WEP. Specify a higher value to increase the bruteforce level: cracking will 
take more time, but with a higher likelyhood of success. 
-H none Long version –help. Output help information. 
-l file 
name 
(Lowercase L, ell) logs the key to the file specified. 
-K none Invokes the Korek WEP cracking method. (Default in v0.x) 
-k korek (WEP cracking) There are 17 korek statistical attacks. Sometimes one attack creates a 
huge false positive that prevents the key from being found, even with lots of IVs. Try 
-k 1, -k 2, … -k 17 to disable each attack selectively. 
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Option Param. Description 
-p threads Allow the number of threads for cracking even if you have a non-SMP computer. 
-r database Utilizes a database generated by airolib-ng as input to determine the WPA key. 
Outputs an error message if aircrack-ng has not been compiled with sqlite support. 
-x/-x0 none (WEP cracking) Disable last keybytes brutforce. 
-x1 none (WEP cracking) Enable last keybyte bruteforcing (default). 
-x2 none (WEP cracking) Enable last two keybytes bruteforcing. 
-X none (WEP cracking) Disable bruteforce multithreading (SMP only). 
-y none (WEP cracking) Experimental single bruteforce attack which should only be used 
when the standard attack mode fails with more than one million IVs 
-u none Long form –cpu-detect. Provide information on the number of CPUs and MMX 
support. Example responses to “aircrack-ng –cpu-detect” are “Nb CPU detected: 2” 
or “Nb CPU detected: 1 (MMX available)”. 
-w words (WPA cracking) Path to a wordlist or “-” without the quotes for standard in (stdin). 
-z none Invokes the PTW WEP cracking method.  
Table 2-1: Aircrack-ng options. 
2.3.4.3 Example  
 To WEP dictionary crack a 64 bit key: 
aircrack-ng -w h:hex.txt,ascii.txt -a 1 -n 64 -e teddy wep10-01.cap 
Where: 
 -w h:hex.txt,ascii.txt is the list of files to use. For files containing hexadecimal 
values, you must put a “h:” in front of the file name. 
 -a 1 says that it is WEP 
 -n 64 says it is 64 bits. Change this to the key length that matches your 
dictionary files. 
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 -e teddy is to optionally select the access point. Your could also use the “-b” 
option to select based on MAC address 
 wep10-01.cap is the name of the file containing the data. It can be the full 
packet or an IVs only file. It must contain be a minimum of four IVs [11]. 
2.3.5 Packetforge-ng 
The purpose of packetforge-ng is to create encrypted packets that can subsequently be 
used for injection. You may create various types of packets such as arp requests, UDP, ICMP 
and custom packets. The most common use is to create ARP requests for subsequent 
injection. 
2.3.5.1 Usage 
Usage: packetforge-ng <mode> <options> 
2.3.5.2 Forge options 
 -p <fctrl> : set frame control word (hex) 
 -a <bssid> : set Access Point MAC address 
 -c <dmac> : set Destination MAC address 
 -h <smac> : set Source MAC address 
 -j : set FromDS bit 
 -o : clear ToDS bit 
 -e : disables WEP encryption 
 -k <ip[:port]> : set Destination IP [Port] 
 -l <ip[:port]> : set Source IP [Port] (Dash lowercase letter L) 
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 -t ttl : set Time To Live 
 -w <file> : write packet to this pcap file 
2.3.5.3 Modes 
 --arp : forge an ARP packet (-0) 
 --udp : forge an UDP packet (-1) 
 --icmp : forge an ICMP packet (-2) 
 --null : build a null packet (-3) 
 --custom : build a custom packet (-9) 
2.4 WEP CRACKING 
In this section we will go though a very simple case to crack a WEP key. It assumes 
you have a working wireless card with drivers already patched for injection.   
The basic concept behind this tutorial is using aireplay-ng replay an ARP packet to 
generate new unique IVs. In turn, aircrack-ng uses the new unique IVs to crack the WEP key. 
It is important to understand what an ARP packet is. 
2.4.1 ARP Request Replay Attack 
The classic ARP request replay attack is the most effective way to generate new 
initialization vectors (IVs), and works very reliably. The program listens for an ARP packet 
then retransmits it back to the access point. This, in turn, causes the access point to repeat the 
ARP packet with a new IV. The program retransmits the same ARP packet over and over. 
However, each ARP packet repeated by the access point has a new IVs. It is all these new IVs 
which allow you to determine the WEP key. 
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ARP is address resolution protocol: A TCP/IP protocol used to convert an IP address 
into a physical address, such as an Ethernet address. A host wishing to obtain a physical 
address broadcasts an ARP request onto the TCP/IP network. The host on the network that 
has the address in the request then replies with its physical hardware address.    
2.4.2 Assumptions 
 You are using drivers patched for injection. Use the injection test to confirm 
your card can inject prior to proceeding.  
 You are physically close enough to send and receive access point packets. 
Remember that just because you can receive packets from the access point 
does not mean you may will be able to transmit packets to the AP. The 
wireless card strength is typically less then the AP strength. So you have to be 
physically close enough for your transmitted packets to reach and be received 
by the AP. You should confirm that you can communicate with the specific AP 
by following these instructions.  
 There is at least one wired or wireless client connected to the network and they 
are active. The reason is that this tutorial depends on receiving at least one 
ARP request packet and if there are no active clients then there will never be 
any ARP request packets. 
 You are using aircrack-ng-1.2-rc2. 
 AP uses WEP protocol for encryption. 
In the examples below, you will need to change “wlan0” to the interface name which 
is specific to your wireless card. 
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2.4.3 Equipment used  
In this tutorial, here is what was used:   
 BSSID (MAC address of access point): E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 
 Station: 7C:C3:A1:A8:08:FF  
 ESSID (Wireless network name): testSonia 
 Access point channel: 9 
 Wireless interface: mon0 
For the penetration testing we used outdoor nodes on nitos testbed (see section 5). 
2.4.4 airmon-ng - Start the wireless interface in monitor mode on AP channel 
The purpose of this step is to put your card into what is called monitor mode. Monitor 
mode is mode whereby your card can listen to every packet in the air. Normally your card will 
only “hear” packets addressed to you. By hearing every packet, we can later select some for 
injection. As well, only (there are some rare exceptions) monitor mode allows you to inject 
packets. (Note: this procedure is for Atheros cards.). This is illustrated in Figure 2-8. 
To begin, you need to first put your wireless adapter into monitor mode , Monitor 
mode is the mode whereby your card can listen to every packet in the air , You can put your 
card into monitor mode by typing in the following commands: 
airmon-ng start wlan0 
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Figure 2-8: Put the Wireless Adapter into Monitor Mode 
You should kill the processes that could cause problem. 
2.4.5 airodump-ng mon0- Finding a suitable Target 
After putting your card into monitor mode, you need to find a network that is 




Figure 2-9: Discover the surrounding networks 
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Bssid shows the mac address of the AP, CH shows the channel in which AP is 
broadcasted and Essid shows the name broadcasted by the AP, Cipher shows 
the encryption type (Figure 2-9). 
Now look out for a wep protected network In my case i’ll take “testSonia’’ as my 
target for rest of the tutorial. 
2.4.6 airodump-ng capture the IVs 
Now to crack the WEP key you’ll have to capture the targets data into a file, To do 
this we use airodump tool again, but with some additional switches to target a specific AP and 
channel. This is illustrated in Figure 2-10. 
Open another console session to capture the generated IVs. Then enter: 
airodump-ng -c 9 -w data-capture --bssid E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 mon0 
Where:   
 -c 9 is the channel for the wireless network 
 --bssid E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 is the access point MAC address. This eliminate 
extraneous traffic.  
 -w data-capture is file name prefix for the file which will contain the IVs. 
 mon0 is the interface name. 
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Figure 2-10: Start Capturing Traffic 
2.4.7 aireplay-ng fake authentication with the access point 
Now you have to capture at least 20,000 data packets to crack WEP .This can be done 
in two ways, The first one would be a (passive attack ) wait for a client to connect to the AP 
and then start capturing the data packets but this method is very slow, it can take days or even 
weeks to capture that many data packets 
The second method would be an (active attack )this method is fast and only takes 
minutes to generate and inject that many packets . 
In an active attack you’ll have do a Fake authentication (connect) with the AP ,then 
you’ll have to generate and inject packets. This can be done very easily by entering the 
following command 
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aireplay-ng -1 0 -a  E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 -h 7C:C3:A1:A8:08:FF -e testSonia --ignore-
negative-one  mon0 
Where:   
 -1 means fake authentication 
 0 reassociation timing in seconds  
 -e testSonia is the wireless network name  
 -a E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 is the access point MAC address 
 -h 7C:C3:A1:A8:08:FF is our card MAC address 
 mon0 is the wireless interface name  
Success looks like Figure 2-11:   
 
Figure 2-11: Fake authentication with the access point 
2.4.8 aireplay-ng - ARP request replay mode 
The purpose of this step is to start aireplay-ng in a mode which listens for ARP 
requests then reinjects them back into the network. 
Open another console session and enter:   
aireplay-ng -3 -b  E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 -h 7C:C3:A1:A8:08:FF -e testSonia --ignore-
negative-one  mon0 
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It will start listening for ARP requests and when it hears one, aireplay-ng will 
immediately start to inject it. Here is Figure 2-11 what the screen looks like when ARP 
requests are being injected :   
 
Figure 2-12: Inject ARP Traffic 
2.4.9 aircrack-ng obtain the WEP key 
 The purpose of this step is to obtain the WEP key from the IVs gathered in the 
previous steps. 
aircrack-ng -z data-capture-01.cap 
With in a few minutes Aircrak will crack the WEP key as shown in Figure 2-12: 
 
Figure 2-13: Crack the Password 
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2.4.10 WEP Vulnerability 
WEP has several vulnerabilities. 
1)Weak Cryptography: Analysis of captured traffic can easily reveal the shared key 
used by WEP. Various tools are available which enable data decryption within few minutes.  
2) Absence of Key Management: WEP does not provide key management and thus, 
same keys are used for longer duration and tend to be of poor quality [12].  
3) Small key size: The standard specified for WEP provides support for 40 bit key 
only, thus it is prone to brute force attacks. Offline dictionary attack is a type of brute force 
attack where frequently used words for encryption are considered and the result is compared 
with captured traffic to reveal the secret passphrase.  
4) Reuse initialization vector: Initialization vector is reused and thus, data can easily 
be decrypted without the knowledge of encryption key using various cryptanalytic methods. 
5) Lack of Replay protection: WEP does not provide protection against replay attacks, 
thus, an attacker can record and replay packets and they will be accepted as genuine.  
6) Authentication issues: Challenge-response scheme is used in shared key 
authentication but it can lead to man-in-the-middle attack. Man-in-themiddle attacks set up 
illegitimate access points within range of wireless clients in order to gain access to sensitive 
information.  
7) Jamming: Availability can be impacted i.e. electromagnetic energy emitted on 
wireless LAN’s frequency by a device making WLAN unusable.  
8) Packet Forgery: WEP does not provide any protection measures against packet 
forgery.  
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9) Flooding: An attacker can send large number of messages to access point (AP) and 
thus, preventing the AP from processing the traffic [12]. 
In 2001, Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir discovered a flaw in the WEP key scheduling 
algorithm. The main function of RC4 is pseudorandom generation. RC4 works by setting up a 
256 byte array containing 0 to 255 values. Each value in the array appears only once. The 
order of the values can be randomized, known as permutation. So, there will be different 
permutation of the array each time. So there are many permutations i.e. 512 * 256! 
possibilities. This property makes RC4 implementation strong. However , Fluhrer, Mantin, 
and Shamir analyzed that “some part of the secret key is used with different exposed values, 
an attacker can generate the secret part by analyzing some portion of number of bits in the 
first few bytes of the keystream with relatively less work”. In WEP the secret shared key is 
concatenated with the visible IV value. This weakness is known as “IV weakness” [13]. 
2.4.11 Conclusion 
The WEP protocol provides some level of security to wireless communication 
between wireless accesspoint and wireless devices. But it has many weaknesses due to the 
small IV space and a poor selection of CRC32 for the data integrity verification. So, instead 
of just relying on the WEP security alone additional measures must to be taken to provide 
better security among wireless devices. 
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Κεφάλαιο 3 WPA 
In order to overcome the flaws of WEP, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) was 
introduced in 2003 by the Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) alliance. WPA implements majority of 
the IEEE 802.11i standard, thus it is an intermediate solution. WPA was intended to address 
the WEP cryptographic problems without requiring new hardware.  
3.1 Studding WPA 
WPA provides the following security features: 
3.1.1 WPA Encryption Process 
WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for encryption [10]. A new key is 
dynamically generated for every packet; 128 bit per packet key is used. Michael algorithm is 
used by TKIP to generate Message Integrity Code (MIC) which provides enhanced data 
integrity as compared to CRC-32 used in WEP. Also, TKIP provides replay protection. 
3.1.2 WPA Authentication Mechanisms 
The two authentication mechanisms provided by WPA are: 
1. WPA-Personal or WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key): WPA uses Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for encryption [10]. A new key is dynamically 
generated for every packet; 128 bit per packet key is used. Michael algorithm 
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is used by TKIP to generate Message Integrity Code (MIC) which provides 
enhanced data integrity as compared to CRC-32 used in WEP. Also, TKIP 
provides replay protection. MSDU is Medium Access Control Service Data 
Unit and MPDU is Medium Access Control Protocol Data Unit 
2. WPA Authentication Mechanisms. The two authentication mechanisms 
provided by WPA are: 
1. WPA-Personal or WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key): Pre-Shared  Key  is  
a  static  key  shared  between  two  parties  for  initiating  the 
communication. The key which is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in 
TKIP process must be in place before an association can be established 
[23]. WPAPersonal is suitable for home and small office networks and 
an authentication server is not required. The wireless devices are 
authenticated with access point using 256 bit key. The key is never 
transmitted over air since station and access point already possess this 
key before initiating the communication. Also, 64 bit MIC key and 128 
bit encryption key can be derived from pre shared key [12]. 
2. WPA-Enterprise: This is designed for enterprise networks. IEEE 
802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) provide stronger 
authentication. In this mode, Remote Authentication Dial In User 
Service (RADIUS) server is required which provides excellent security 
for wireless network traffic [16, 31]. The various EAP methods are 
EAP- Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP- LEAP), 
EAP- Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneled (EAP-FAST), EAP- 
Message Digest 5 (EAP-MD5), EAP- Transport Layer Security (EAP-
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TLS), EAP- Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS), EAP-  
Subscriber Identity Module of Global System for Mobile 
Communications (EAP-SIM) [12]. 
3.2 WPA vs. WEP 
3.2.1 802.1X authentication 
This protocol allows users to authenticate into a wireless network by means of a 
RADIUS Server.  
3.2.2 WPA key management 
One of the biggest drawbacks to traditional WEP security is that changing the 
encryption key is optional. Even if you do switch encryption keys from time to time, there is 
no option for globally rekeying all access points and all wireless NICs. Instead, rekeying is a 
tedious manual process and is completely impractical for large organizations. After all, the 
instant you rekey an access point, none of the clients will be able to access it until they are 
also rekeyed. 
But with WPA, the rekeying of global encryption keys is required. In the case of 
unicast traffic, the encryption key is changed after every frame using Temporary Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP). This protocol allows key changes to occur on a frame by frame 
basis and to be automatically synchronized between the access point and the wireless client. 
Global rekeying works by advertising the new keys to wireless clients. 
The TKIP is really the heart and soul of WPA security. TKIP replaces WEP 
encryption. And although WEP is optional in standard Wi-Fi, TKIP is required in WPA. The 
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TKIP encryption algorithm is stronger than the one used by WEP but works by using the 
same hardware-based calculation mechanisms WEP uses. 
The TKIP protocol actually has several functions. First, it determines which 
encryption keys will be used and then verifies the client's security configuration. Second, it is 
responsible for changing the unicast encryption key for each frame. Finally, TKIP sets a 
unique starting key for each authenticated client that is using a preshared key. 
3.2.3  WPA Shortcomings 
i. WPA uses old cryptography algorithm RC4 instead  of superior Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). 
 ii. WPA is vulnerable to brute force attacks in case of weak passphrase for pre shared 
key mode.  
iii. Prone to threats during Hash collisions due to use of hash functions for TKIP key 
mixing.  
 iv. Also, WPA remains vulnerable to availability attacks like Denial of Service. 
3.2.4 Checksums and replay protection 
When WEP was initially designed, IEEE took steps to ensure that an encrypted packet 
could not be tampered with. WEP-encrypted packets include a checksum value at the end of 
the packet. This value is a 32-bit code that is derived from the rest of the packet. The idea is 
that if something in the packet's payload changes, the checksum will not match the packet any 
longer and the packet can be assumed to be corrupt. This 32-bit code is called the Integrity 
Check Value (ICV). 
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Although ICV is a good idea, it just isn't secure. There are hacker tools that allow 
someone to modify a WEP-encrypted packet and to modify the ICV as well. By modifying 
the ICV to match the modified payload, the receiver will be unable to tell that the packet has 
been tampered with. 
To counteract this type of hacking, WPA supports a security measure called Michael. 
Michael works similarly to ICV but calculates a Message Integrity Code (MIC) in addition to 
the ICV. The wireless devices calculate the MIC using the same mechanisms they would 
normally use to calculate the ICV. 
The first major difference is that the MIC is only eight bits, as opposed to the ICV's 32 
bits. WPA still uses an ICV in the same way that WEP does, but the MIC is inserted between 
the data portion of the frame and the ICV. 
The MIC has two main purposes. First, it is encrypted along with the rest of the frame 
and makes it much more difficult to tamper with a frame's data. Second, the MIC contains a 
frame counter. This prevents someone from launching a wireless replay attack [13]. 
3.3 Cracking WPA 
3.3.1 Requirements: 
1. Wireless card (support promiscuous mode) 
In this tutorial we use Atheros 802.11a/b/g   &   Atheros 802.11a/b/g/n (MIMO). 
2. Access point with WPA Encryption Protocol and a SSID named “ testSonia”. 
3. A Station Point which is connected to the AP. 
4. A third node with the aicrack –suite tool. 
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Figure 3-1 illustrates the Access point with WPA protocol. 
 
Figure 3-1: Access point with WPA. 
The Key negotiation with the  AP is illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2: Key negotiation with AP. 
3.3.2 Step 1 – Start the wireless interface in monitor mode 
We start the monitor mode: 
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airmon-ng 
airmon-ng start wlan0 
This is illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3: Put the wireless interface in monitor mode 
Where: wlan0 is the wireless interface name. 
3.3.3 Step 2 – Start airodump-ng to collect authentication handshake and keep 
it running until 4 - way handshake is captured 
Next, we start airodump-ng to collect authentication handshake and keep it running 
until 4 - way handshake is captured. This is illustrated in Figure 3-4. 
 
airodump-ng -c 9 -w data-capture --bssid E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 wlan0 
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Figure 3-4: Collect authentication handshake 
Where:  
 -c 9 is the channel for the target wireless network. 
 bssid E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 is the MAC address of the target AP. 
 --write Sonia  is the file name prefix for the file which will contain the IVs. 
 wlan0 is the interface name in monitor mode. 
We can see in Figure 3-5 the .cap created file. 
 
Figure 3-5: The Sonia.cap file. 
3.3.4 Step 3 – Start aireplay-ng  
In the event you could not get a handshake, the following method is used to force 
traffic on a network and to de-authenticate a client from an accesspoint, forcing them to re-
authenticate leading to a successful WPA handshake. This is illustrated in Figure 3-6. 
aireplay-ng --deauth 5 -a E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 -c 64:80:99:24:05:C0 -e testSonia --ignore-
negative-one wlan0 
Where: 
 5 means run the fragmentation attack 
 -a E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 is the MAC address of the target AP 
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 -c 64:80:99:24:05:C0 is the MAC address of the client to be de-authenticated.  
 wlan0 is the interface name in monitor mode. 
 
Figure 3-6: Fake authentication with the access point. 
Figure 3-7  illustrates the successful handshakes. 
 
Figure 3-7: Create traffic on the network 
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3.3.5 Step 5 – Crack the pre-shared key 
Use aircrack-ng to crack the pre-shared key. 
aircrack-ng -w password -b E4:CE:8F:62:25:58 Sonia016-01.cap 
Where: 
 -w password is the dictionary file. Download and copy/save a word list (for 
this example we downloaded a wordlist from this link 
http://ftp.sunet.se/pub/security/tools/net/Openwall/wordlists/passwords/passwo
rd.gz).  
 - b E4:CE:8F:62:25:58  is the MAC address of the target access point 
 Sonia016-01.cap is the file containing captured 4-way handshake. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-8: The use of aircrack-ng to crack the pre-shared key. 
If the key is small we will have the passphrase within minutes, but a password with a 
large number of characters takes very long time to find it.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
By comparing the weaknesses and advantages of WEP vs. WPA, a conclusion can be 
reached that WPA or (Wi-Fi Protected Access) is a more reasonable choice in choosing a 
network security protocol because it allows for a longer IV length, much better encryption 
methods by preventing the reuse of IV keys, and by not allowing master keys to be used 
directly thus resulting in a decrease in the ability of hackers to get into the network and 
system. 
Βy its contracture  the WPA is quite safe and free from the weaknesses of WEP, but 
its safety came into question in 2008 where researchers Erik Tews and Martin Beck presented 
a way to break the TKIP that endangers the security of WPA. The main defense mechanism of 
wpa against attacks is a strong Preshared key. A Strong Preshared key means a random 
alphanumeric string with length at least 10-byte. This combined with a good network SSID 
makes cracking quite difficult for a malicious user. 
In the following chapter we introduce a new Wireless Encryption Protocol, WPA2, 
which was implemented due to many proven vulnerabilities of the previous protocols. 
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Κεφάλαιο 4 WPA2 
With the increase in use of Wireless Networks, the initial protocols, Wireless 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) first, then Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), used to secure wireless 
communications were found inadequate due to many proven vulnerabilities so a new protocol 
was implemented, the Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protocol. In this chapter we first 
discuss the benefits of the Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protocol used to secure 
communications in Wireless Networks over previous protocols and the vulnerabilities 
addressed. Then we discuss the available modes to secure a wireless network using the Wi-Fi 
Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protocol and finally explore its vulnerabilities. In conclusion, we 
present possible solutions and/or suggestions on how the Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) 
protocol vulnerabilities might be mitigated and/or addressed through enhancements or new 
protocols. 
In June 2004, the final release of the 802.11i standard was adopted and received the 
commercial name WPA2 from the Wi-Fi Alliance. WPA2 makes use of a specific mode of 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) known as the Counter Mode Cipher Block 
Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) protocol (CCMP). CCMP provides 
both data confidentiality (encryption) and data integrity. The use of the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) is a more secure alternative to the RC4 stream cipher used by WEP and 
WPA.   
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
46 
4.1 WPA2 vs WPA 
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) and WPA2 are two of the security measures that can 
be used to protect wireless networks. WPA uses TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) 
while WPA2 is capable of using TKIP or the more advanced AES algorithm. 
WPA was created to replace WEP in securing wireless networks when it was found 
out that serious flaws made it very easy to gain access. Despite being much harder to crack, it 
was still possible with the use of more advanced tools. 
WPA2 addresses this problem with the introduction of the AES algorithm. 
Theoretically, passphrases created with the AES algorithm are virtually uncrackable. Most 
people and businesses who have wireless networks should find WPA2 to be more than 
adequate for their security needs. 
The only disadvantage of WPA2 is in the amount of processing power that it needs in 
order to protect your network. This translates to a direct need for more powerful hardware or 
suffer a reduction in network performance for heavily used networks. This is an issue with 
older access points which were designed and built prior to WPA2 and only implemented 
WPA2 via a firmware upgrade. Most of the more recent access points have been equipped 
with more capable hardware to minimize the speed degradation. 
You should use WPA2 if you are capable as it provides the maximum protection 
regardless of whether you fully need that much protection. The only time that using WPA 
would be sufficient is when your access point is not capable of supporting WPA2. You could 
also fall back to WPA if your access point routinely experiences high loads and the network 
speeds suffers from the utilization of WPA2. But for establishments where security is of 
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utmost importance, buying better access points is the only option [20]. Table 4-1 illustrates 
the comparison of WPA and WPA2 protocol. 
 WPA WPA2 
Stands For Wi-Fi Protected Access Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 
What Is It? A security protocol developed 
by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2003 
for use in securing wireless 
networks; designed to replace 
the WEP protocol. 
A security protocol developed 
by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2004 
for use in securing wireless 
networks; designed to replace 
the WEP and WPA protocols. 
Methods As a temporary solution to 
WEP's problems, WPA still 
uses WEP's insecure RC4 
stream cipher but provides extra 
security through TKIP. 
Unlike WEP and WPA, WPA2 
uses the AES standard instead 
of the RC4 stream cipher. 
CCMP replaces WPA's TKIP. 
Secure and Recommended? Somewhat. Superior to WEP, 
inferior to WPA2. 
Yes, though more secure when 
Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) is 
disabled. 
Table 4-1: WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) vs WPA2.  
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4.2 RSNA (Robust Security Network Association) 
The new architecture for wireless networks is called the Robust Security Network 
(RSN) and uses 802.1X authentication, robust key distribution and new integrity and privacy 
mechanisms.  
If the authentication or association procedure used between stations uses the 4-way 
handshake, the association is called the RSNA (Robust Security Network Association). 
Establishing a secure communication context consists of four phases: 
 agreeing on the security policy,  
 802.1X authentication,  
 key derivation and distribution,  
 RSNA data confidentiality and integrity. 
4.2.1 Agreeing on the security policy 
Security policies supported by the access point are advertised on Beacon or in a Probe 
Respond message. A standard open authentication follows. The client response is included in 
the Association Request message validated by an Association Response from the access point. 
Security policy information is sent in the RSN IE (Information Element) field, detailing: 
 supported authentication methods (802.1X, Pre-Shared Key (PSK)),  
 security protocols for unicast traffic (CCMP, TKIP etc.) – the pairwise cipher 
suite,  
 security protocols for multicast traffic (CCMP, TKIP etc.) – the group cipher 
suite, 
 support for pre-authentication, allowing users to pre-authenticate  
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4.2.2 802.1X authentication 
802.1X authentication is initiated when the access point requests client identity data, 
with the client’s response containing the preferred authentication method. Suitable messages 
are then exchanged between the client and the authentication server to generate a common 
master key (MK). At the end of the procedure, a Radius Accept message is send from the 
authentication server to the access point, containing the MK and a final EAP Success message 
for the client.  
 
Figure 4-1: 802.1X authentication 
4.2.3 Key hierarchy and distribution 
Connection security relies heavily on secret keys. In RSN, each key has a limited 
lifetime and overall security is ensured using a collection of various keys, organised into a 
hierarchy. When a security context is established after successful authentication, temporary 
(session) keys are created and regularly updated until the security context is closed. Two 
handshakes occur during key derivation 
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 4-Way Handshake for PTK (Pairwise Transient Key) and GTK (Group 
Transient Key)  derivation, 
 Group Key Handshake for GTK renewal. 
4.2.4 RSNA data confidentiality and integrity 
All the keys generated previously are used in protocols supporting RSNA data 
confidentiality and integrity: 
 TKIP (Temporal Key Hash),  
 CCMP (Counter-Mode / Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
Protocol), 
 WRAP (Wireless Robust Authenticated Protocol). 
4.3 Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) Protocol (CCMP)  
Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol 
(CCMP) is an encryption protocol that forms part of the 802.11i standard for wireless local 
area networks (WLANs), particularly those using WiMax technology. CCMP was the second 
security protocol introduced as a replacement for WEP in the 802.11i amendment CCMP 
made from scratch using the modern AES block cipher. CCMP is based on the CCM of the 
AES encryption algorithm. CCM combines CTR for confidentiality and CBC-MAC for 
authentication and integrity. This is illustrated in Figure 4-2. CCM protects the integrity of 
both the MPDU Data field and selected portions of the IEEE 802.11 MPDU header [15]. 
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Figure 4-2: Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol 
4.3.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also referenced as Rijndael (its original 
name), is a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001 [16]. 
AES is a strong encryption algorithm used in symmetric key cryptography. The 
chosen algorithm behind the Advanced Encryption System label was the Rijndael algorithm. 
AES / Rijndael support different key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bit key lengths. The longer 
the key length used the stronger and more difficult the encryption will be to break into. 
However using a 256 bit key to protect and encrypt data would also mean it will require more 
processing power and take longer to process. 
 Depending on the key lengths and block sizes AES produces a number of rounds of 
computation. 
In a block and key size of 128 bits, there are 10 computation rounds. In a block and 
key size of 192 bits, there are 12 computation rounds. In a block and key size of 256 bits, 
there are 14 computation rounds. 
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AES became the replacement for 3DES and DES. DES in particular was found to be 
weak and breakable. AES is a popular encryption standard approved by the government and 
supported by all VPN vendors. 
AES today is also used in removable media such as USB's and external hard drives. It 
is effective in both hardware and software and uses less memory than most other symmetric 
algorithms. Simply put, you can protect your data on your USB memory stick using 
encryption software running the AES algorithm. If an encrypted USB was stolen and in the 
wrong hands, data would be protected and would be in an un-readable format [17]. 
As well as AES, some other common symmetric encryption algorithms are DES, 
3DES, blowfish, Twofish, IDEA, CAST, SAFER, Skipjack and RC. 
4.4 The 4-Way Handshake 
Purpose of the 4-Way Handshake is to generate a PTK. PTK is a 512-bit session based 
key, which is derived from the PMK authenticators address, supplicants address, 
authenticators’ nonce (ANonce) and supplicants’ nonce (SNonse). The 4-Way Handshake, 
initiated by the access point, makes it possible to: 
 confirm the client’s knowledge of the PMK, 
 derive a fresh PTK, 
 install encryption and integrity keys, 
 encrypt transport of the GTK, 
 confirm cipher suite selection. 
Four EAPOL-Key messages are exchanged between the client and the access point 
during the 4-Way Handshake. This process is illustrated in Figure 4-3. The PTK is derived 
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from the PMK, a fixed string, the MAC address of the access point, the MAC address of the 
client and two random numbers (ANonce and SNonce, generated by the authenticator and 
supplicant respectively).  
The access point initiates the first message by selecting the random number ANonce 
and sending it to the supplicant, without encrypting the message or otherwise protecting it 
against tampering. The supplicant generates its own random number SNonce and can now 
calculate the PTK and derived temporary keys, so it sends SNonce and the MIC key 
calculated from the second message using the KCK key. 
 When the authenticator receives the second message, it can extract SNonce (because 
the message is not encrypted) and calculate the PTK and derived temporary keys. Now it can 
verify the value of the MIC in the second message and thus be sure that the supplicant knows 
the PMK and has correctly calculated the PTK and derived temporary keys.  
The third message sent by the authenticator to the supplicant contains the GTK 
(encrypted with the KEK key), derived from a random GMK and GNonce, along with an MIC 
calculated from the third message using the KCK key. When the supplicant receives this 
message, the MIC is checked to ensure that the authenticator knows the PMK and has 
correctly calculated the PTK and derived temporary keys. The last message acknowledges 
completion of the whole handshake and indicates that the supplicant will now install the key 
and start encryption. Upon receipt, the authenticator installs its keys after verifying the MIC 
value. Thus, the mobile device and the access point have obtained, computed and installed 
encryption keys and are now able to communicate over a secure channel for unicast and 
multicast traffic. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
54 
 
Figure 4-3: The 4-Way Handshake. 
4.5 Vulnerabilities of WPA2 
 DoS (Denial of Service) attacks like RF jamming, data flooding, and Layer 2 
session hijacking, are all attacks against availability. None of the Wi-Fi 
security standards can prevent attacks on the physical layer simply because 
they operate on Layer 2 an above. Similarly none of the standards can deal 
with AP failure.   
 Management Frames – report network topology and modify client behavior - 
are not protected so they provide an attacker the means to discover the layout 
of the network, pinpoint the location of devices therefore allowing for more 
successful DoS attacks against a network.    
 Control Frames – are not protected leaving them open to DoS attacks.   
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 Deauthentication – the aim is to force the client to reauthenticate, which 
coupled with the lack of authentication for control frames which are used for 
authentication and association make it possible for the attacker to spoof MAC 
addresses. Mass deauthentication is also possible.   
 Disassociation – the aim is to force an authenticated client with multiple AP’s 
to disassociate from them therefore affecting the forwarding of packets to and 
from the client [18]. 
4.5.1 Hole196 
"Hole196" is a vulnerability in the WPA2 security protocol exposing 
WPA2-secured Wi-Fi networks to insider attacks. AirTight Networks 
uncovered a weakness in the WPA2 protocol, which was documented but 
buried on the last line on page 196 of the 1232-page IEEE 802.11 Standard 
(Revision, 2007). Thus, the moniker “Hole196.” 
As a client connects to a WPA or WPA2 network, two sets of temporal keys are 
generated, which are used to encrypt individual frames on the wireless network. The pairwise 
transient keys (PTK) for unicast traffic are unique to each connection and groupwise transient 
keys (GTK) for broadcast/ multicast traffic, which are shared amongst all the devices on the 
network.   Using the shared GTK the attacker can send spoofed broadcast or multicast packets 
directly to other wireless clients on the network.  The benefit of this approach for the attacker 
is circumventing passing the traffic over the wired network where other systems and 
protection mechanisms may detect that an attack has occurred. The most common application 
of this attack is to perform address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing in which the malicious 
user masquerades as the default router for all traffic on the wireless network. The victim 
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machine then forwards all traffic intended for the access point to the malicious insider 
creating a man-in-the-middle attack. Another possible attack is wireless denial of service 
(DoS). The attacker sends a malicious broadcast frame with a high packet number, causing 
victim clients to ignore legitimate frames with packet numbers less than the number set by the 
malicious frame [19]. 
4.6 ATTACKS AGAINST A WPA2 NETWORK  
Wireless networks are vulnerable by definition due to the fact that they use radio 
frequency which is a broadcast technology as a medium of transmission. The transmission can 
be intercepted by anyone who is in range. 
The most common attacks against a wpa2 network are the followings: 
 Dictionary Attack (Aircrack) 
 Brute Force Attack (John the Ripper)  
 Dictionary Attack with CPUs (Pyrit) 
 Pre-computed tables (Rainbow) 
 Cloud (Amazon) 
4.6.1   Dictionary Attack 
In cryptanalysis and computer security, a dictionary attack is a technique used to try to 
defeat a cipher or authentication mechanism by trying likely possibilities which would reduce 
the search space of a brute force attack such as words from a dictionary. This method is based 
on the fact that individuals tend to choose a simple, short and common word from a 
dictionary.  The dictionary attack will try all the combinations of words from a given text file, 
hash word by word and expect to get the correct PMK [21]. 
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4.6.2 Brute Force Attack 
In the most simple terms, brute force means to systematically try all the combinations 
for a password. This method is quite efficient for short passwords, but would start to become 
infeasible to try, even on modern hardware, with a password of 7 characters or larger. 
Assuming only alphabetical characters, all in capitals or all in lower-case, it would take 
267 (8,031,810,176) guesses. This also assumes that the cracker knows the length of the 
password. Other factors include number, case-sensitivity, and other symbols on the keyboard. 
The complexity of the password depends upon the creativity of the user and the complexity of 
the program that is using the password. The upside to the brute force attack is that it will 
ALWAYS find the password, no matter it's complexity.  
Brute-force attacks are only effective when they can check passwords at a high speed, 
as the number of potential passwords grows exponentially with a larger character set and 
longer password length (possible passwords =n[password length] , where n is the number of 
possible characters). The Figure 4-4 shows the Possible passwords by using the English 
Language. 
 
Figure 4-4: Possible passwords. [22]. 
Examples of programs that use brute force attacks: John the Ripper (see Figure 4-
5), Rarcrack, and Oracle.  John the Ripper is free and Open Source software, distributed 
primarily in source code form. 
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Figure 4-5: Cracking with John the Ripper. 
4.6.3 Rainbow tables 
Rainbow Tables and RainbowCrack come from the work and subsequent paper by 
Philippe Oechslin. 1 The method, known as the Faster Time-Memory Trade-Off Technique, is 
based on research by Martin Hellman & Ronald Rivest done in the early 1980’s on the 
performance trade-offs between processing time and the memory needed for cryptanalysis. In 
his paper published in 2003, Oechslin refined the techniques and showed that the attack could 
reduce the time to attack 99.9%of Microsoft's LAN Manager passwords (alpha characters 
only) to 13.6 seconds from 101 seconds. Further algorithm refinements also reduced the 
number of false positives produced by the system. The main benefit of Rainbow Tables is that 
while the actual creation of the rainbow tables takes much more time than cracking a single 
hash, after they are generated you can use the tables over and over again. Additionally, once 
you have generated the Rainbow Tables, RainbowCrack is faster than brute force attacks and 
needs less memory than full dictionary attacks [28]. 
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4.6.4 Pyrit 
Pyrit takes a step ahead in attacking WPA-PSK and WPA2-PSK, the protocol that 
today de-facto protects public WIFI-airspace. Pyrit does not provide binary files or wordlists 
and does not encourage anyone to participate or engage in any harmful activity. This is a 
research project, not a cracking tool.   
Pyrit’s implementation allows to create massive databases, pre-computing part of the 
WPA/WPA2 PSK authentication phase in a space-time-tradeoff. The performance gain for 
real-world-attacks is in the range of three orders of magnitude which urges for re-
consideration of the protocol’s security. Exploiting the computational power of GPUs or 
CPUs, Pyrit is currently by far the most powerful attack against one of the world’s most used 
security-protocols.  
How it works: 
 Pyrit has a command ‘serve‘ that starts a server on the current host. A server listens for 
connections on port 19935 and can use the local hardware to compute for other clients. 
 Clients can use multiple servers and each server can support multiple clients 
simultaneously. 
 This is not a distributed database! The clients transfer their workunits to the servers 
and the servers compute the results and send them back. Bandwidth is a problem: 
10.000 PMKs/s require about 30kb/s from the client to the server and about 300kb/s 
from the server to the client.  
Pyrit’s storage code was abstracted and refactored which makes it possible to use 
relational databases like postgresql or mysql as storage devices for Pyrit. See Figure 4-6.  The 
actual database code is fully transparent and there is no visible difference for the client. 
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Figure 4-6: Pyrit’s storage method. 
The benefit: Create a central mysql/pgsql/mssql/oracle/firebird/sqlite-server 
somewhere on your network and let multiple Pyrit-clients access and work on the central 
server for good; enjoy the blessings of ACID, partitioning, automatic backup, replication and 
fine-grained user authentication. An example is shown in Figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7: A cluster. 
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Pyrit is free software – free as in freedom. Everyone can inspect, copy or modify it 
and share derived work under the GNU General Public License v3+. It compiles and executes 
on a wide variety of platforms including FreeBSD, MacOS X and Linux as operation-system 
and x86-, alpha-, arm-, hppa-, mips-, powerpc-, s390 and sparc-processors. 
4.6.4.1 Pyrit Options 
Pyrit recognizes the following options: 
 -b BSSID. Specifies a BSSID. Can be used to restrict commands to certain Access-
Points. 
 -e ESSID. Specifies the ESSID. Commands usually refer to all ESSIDs in the database 
if this option is omitted. 
 -i infile. Specifies a filename to read from; the special filename '-' can be used 
for stdin. The file may be gzip-compressed in which case it's name must end in '.gz' 
for transparent decompression. 
 -o outfile. Specifies a filename to write to; the special filename '-' can be used 
for stdout. Filenames that end in '.gz' cause Pyrit to gzip-compress the file on the fly. 
 -r capture-file. Specifies a packet-capture file in pcap format (possibly gzip-
compressed) or a device (e.g. 'wlan0') to capture from. 
 -u URL. Specifies the URL of the storage-device in the form 
of 'driver://username:password@host:port/database'. Pyrit can use the filesystem, a 
remote Pyrit-Relay-Server and SQL-Databases as storage. The driver ‘file://' refers to 
Pyrit's own filesystem-based storage, 'http://'connects to a Pyrit-Relay-Server and all 
other URLs are passed directly to SQLAlchemy. The default storage-URL can also be 
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specified by the key 'default_storage' in Pyrit's configuration file 
(usually'~/.pyrit/config') 
 --all-handshakes. The 
commands attack_batch, attack_db, attack_cowpatty and attack_passthrough aut
omatically use the single handshake of highest quality only. In some cases even this 
handshake may have been wrongfully reconstructed from the captured data, rendering 
the attack futile. In case more than one EAPOL-handshake is reconstructed from the 
capture-file, the option --all-handshakes may be used to attack all handshakes 
reconstructable from the captured data. Exact behaviour of the commands affected by 
this option is described below [22]. 
4.6.4.2 Pyrit Commands 
 analyze 
Parse one or more packet-capture files (in pcap-format, possibly gzip-compressed) and 
try to detect Access-Points, Stations and EAPOL-handshakes. For example: 
pyrit -r "test*.pcap" analyze 
 attack_batch 
Attack an EAPOL-handshake found in the packet-capture file(s) given by the option -
r using the Pairwise Master Keys and passwords stored in the database. The options -b and -
e can be used to specify the Access-Point to attack; it is picked automatically if both options 
are omitted. The password is written to the filename given by the option -o if specified. For 
example: 
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pyrit -r test.pcap -e MyNetwork -b 00:de:ad:c0:de:00 -o MyNetworkPassword.txt 
attack_batch 
 attack_db 
Attack an EAPOL-handshake found in the packet-capture file(s) given by the option -
r using the Pairwise Master Keys stored in the database. The options -b and -e can be used to 
specify the Access-Point to attack; it is picked automatically if both options are omitted. The 
password is written to the filename given by the option -o if specified. For example: 
pyrit -r test.pcap -e MyOtherNetwork attack_db 
 batch 
Start to translate all passwords in the database into their respective Pairwise Master 
Keys and store the results in the database. The option -e may be used to restrict this command 
to a single ESSID; if it is ommitted, all ESSIDs are processed one after the other in undefined 
order. For example: 
pyrit -e NETGEAR batch 
 benchmark 
Determine the peak-performance of the available hardware by computing dummy-
results. For example: 
pyrit benchmark 
 create_essid 
Add new ESSIDs to the database. A single ESSID may be given by the option -e. 
Multiple ESSIDs can be created by supplying a file (one per line) via the option -i. Re-
creating an existing ESSID does not result in an error. For example: 
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pyrit -e NETGEAR create_essid 
 delete_essid 
Delete the ESSID given by -e from the database. This includes all results that may 
have been stored for that particular ESSID. For example: 
pyrit -e NETGEAR delete_essid 
 eval 




Write all passwords that are currently stored in the database to a new file given by -o. 
Passwords are terminated by a single newline-character (\n). Existing files are overwritten 
without confirmation. For example: 
pyrit -o myword.txt.gz export_passwords 
 import_passwords 
Read the file given by -i and import one password per line to the database. The 
passwords may contain all characters (including NULL-bytes) apart from the terminating 
newline-character \n. Passwords that are not suitable for being used with WPA-/WPA2-PSK 
are ignored. Pyrit's storage-implementation guarantees that all passwords remain unique 
throughout the entire database. For example: 
pyrit -i dirty_words.txt import_passwords 
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 list_cores 
Show a list of all available hardware modules Pyrit currently uses. For example: 
pyrit list_cores 
 relay 
Start a server to relay another storage device via XML-RPC; other Pyrit-clients can 
use the server as storage-device. This allows to have network-based access to storage source 
that don’t provide network-access on their own (like file:// and sqlite://) or hide a SQL-
database behind a firewall and let multiple clients access that database only via Pyrit’s RPC-
interface. The TCP-port 17934 must be open for this function to work. For example, on the 
server (where the database is): 
-u sqlite:////var/local/pyrit.db relay 
 pyrit serve 
Start a server that provides access to the local computing hardware to help other Pyrit-
clients. The server's IP-address should be added to the clients' configuration file 
(usually '~/.pyrit/config') as a space-separated list under known_clients. These 
clients' rpc_server-setting must also be set to 'true'. The TCP- and UDP-Port 17935 must be 
accessible. For example, on the server (where the GPU is) [22]: 
pyrit serve 
4.6.4.3 Pyrit Database Preparation 
Pyrit can store ESSIDs, passwords/passphrases and their corresponding Pairwise 
Master Keys in a database. This is a very useful function as it is doing the major task of pre-
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computing tables of Pairwise Master Keys and ESSIDs. This will vastly reduce the time 
needed to guess the password . This is illustrated in Figure 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-8: Pyrit Database. 
As mentioned earlier you can make use of SQL databases instead of file based 
database by using SQLAlchemy.  
By using the command “import_passwords” the file given by -i is read and imports 
one password per line to the database. The passwords may contain all characters (including 
NULL-bytes) apart from the terminating newline-character \n. Passwords that are not suitable 
for being used with WPA-/WPA2-PSK are ignored (smaller than 8 characters). Pyrit's 
storage-implementation guarantees that all passwords remain unique throughout the entire 
database. For example: 
pyrit -i dirty_words.txt import_passwords 
the above command imports a worlist named dirty_words.txt to the database. See 
section 5.3.  
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4.6.5 Wordlists 
When it comes to password cracking, the fastest and most effective method is using a 
wordlist. It is more flexible than rainbow tables and it is faster than brute force. A good 
wordlist is key to cracking a lot of hashes, and that is why it is worth spending some time on 
building one. 
Building a wordlist is not for the faint hearted. It requires some knowledge on good 
data sources, word frequency, basic algorithms, data manipulation and a powerful computer 
that can do the heavy lifting.  
There are tons of wordlists floating around on the Internet. Some of them are 
illustrated in Figure 4-9. One thing they have in common is that they are poorly made and 
filled with garbage. There are as good as bad wordlists on the Internet too [24]. And always 
we should brute force in the native language. 
  
Figure 4-9: Wordlists 
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Do note there are also various tools to generate wordlists for brute forcing based on 
information gathered such as documents and web pages (such as Wyd – password profiling 
tool).  
4.6.6 Crunch 
Crunch is a wordlist generator based on the user specified character set. It takes the 
character set designated by the user and generates all combinations and permutations possible 
into a nice new wordlist for you to use in your dictionary/bruteforce tools. It supports lower 
and upper alpha-numeric as well as special character set and also has the ability to break the 
output into multiple files based on the number of lines or designated file size. It also has the 
ability to pause and resume which is helpful when generating very large wordlists that may 
take some time to fully compile. 
4.6.6.1 Basic syntax 
Basic syntax of CRUNCH looks like this: 
./ crunch <min-len> <max-len> [-f /path/to/charset.lst charset-name] [-o  wordlist.txt] 
      [-t [FIXED]@@@@] [-s startblock] [-c number] 
4.6.6.2 Options 
Breakdown of Syntax: 
 min-len is the minimum length string you want crunch to start at. This option 
is required even for parameters that won't use the value. 
 max-len is the maximum length string you want crunch to end at. This option 
is required even for parameters that won't use the value. 
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 -b number[type] Optional. Specifies the size of the output file, only works if -
o START is used. 
 -c number Optional. Specifies the number of lines to write to output file, only 
works if -o START is used 
 -f </path/to/charset.lst> <charset-name> Optional. Allows you to specify a 
character set from the charset.lst 
 -I Inverts the output so instead of aaa,aab,aac,aad, etc you get 
aaa,baa,caa,daa,aba,bba, etc 
 -m Has been merged with -p. Please use -p instead. 
 -o <wordlist.txt> Optional. Allows you to specify the file to write the output 
to, eg: wordlist.txt 
 -p <charset> OR -p <word1 word2 ...>Optional. Tells crunch to generate 
words that don't have repeating characters.  
 -q <filename.txt> Optional. Tells crunch to read filename.txt and permute 
what is read. This is like the -p option except it gets the input from 
filename.txt. 
 -r Optional. Tells crunch to resume generate words from where it left off. You 
must use the same command as the original command used to generate the 
words. The only exception to this is the -s option. If your original command 
used the -s option you MUST remove it before you resume the session. Just 
add -r to the end of the original command. 
 -s <startblock> Optional. Allows you to specify the starting string, eg: 
03god22fs 
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 -t <@*%^> Optional. Allows you to specify a pattern, eg: @@god@@@@ 
where the only the @'s, *'s, %'s, and ^'s will change. It will also take user 
specified character sets for each group of characters. 
 @ will insert lower case characters 
 will insert upper case characters 
 % will insert numbers 
 ^ will insert symbols 
 -z <gzip|bzip2|lzma> Optional. Compresses the output from the -o option [25].  
4.6.6.3 Running Cruch program in a VmWorkastation 
We have installed kali linux in a VmWorkastation, as it is illustrated in Figure 4-10. 
Then we used the Cruch program to make our wordlists.  
 
Figure 4-10: Kali linux in a VmWorkastation. 
Firstly, we run the command:  
crunch 4 4 qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm –t ab@@ -o wordAbs.lst 
Where: 
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 4 is the minimum length string we want crunch to start at. 
 4 is the maximum length string we want crunch to end at. 
 “qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm”  is the set of characters that the symbol  @ 
will choose each time.  
 -t specifies a pattern. The symbol @ stands for lower case characters. 
 -o specifies the output file. 
The output is shown in Figure 4-11. 
 
Figure 4-11: Crunch command with characters. 
Then we run the command: 
crunch 10 10 0123456789 –o wordListsNumbers 
The output is shown in Figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-12: Crunch command with numbers. 
 10 is the minimum length string we want crunch to start at. 
 10 is the maximum length string we want crunch to end at. 
 “0123456789”  is the set of numbers that will be chosen each time. 
 -o specifies the output file. 
Finally, we run the command: 
crunch 10 10 0123456789 –t 69%%%%%%%% -b 3mb –o START kinita 
The output is shown in Figure 4-13. 
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Figure 4-13: Crunch command with phone numbers. 
 10 is the minimum length string we want crunch to start at. 
 10 is the maximum length string we want crunch to end at. 
 “0123456789”  is the set of numbers that the symbol  % will choose from each 
time.  
 -t specifies a pattern. The symbol % stands for numbers. 
 -b specifies the size of the output file, only works if -o START is used. 
 -o specifies the output file. 
In figure 4-14 we can see the output file kinita.lst. 
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Figure 4-14: The output file kinita.lst 
In figure 4-15 we can see the output files wordListNumbers.lst and wordsAb.lst. 
 
Figure 4-15: The output files wordListNumbers.lst and wordsAb.lst. 
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4.7 Cracking WPA2 in Cloud 
Cloud computing is named so because the data and applications exist on a “cloud” of 
Web servers. Cloud computing is a technology that uses the internet and central remote 
servers to maintain data and applications. This is illustrated in Figure 4-16. 
 
Figure 4-16: Cloud computing. 
Cloud computing allows consumers and businesses to use applications without 
installation and access their personal files at any computer with internet access. This 
technology allows for much more efficient computing by centralizing storage, memory, 
processing and bandwidth. Many people have been confusing cloud computing with ‘Utility 
Computing’ or ‘Grid Computing’ and so are many companies who in their proclamation of 
providing “Cloud Computing” actually provide the service of Utility Computing. 
In a grid computing system, networked computers are able to access and use the 
resources of every other computer on the network whereas in cloud computing systems that 
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usually only applies to the back end. Utility computing is a business model where one 
company pays another company for access to computer applications or data storage. In this 
way, utility computing is relatively straightforward. Cloud computing, in contrast, is much 
less direct. While all the services are still being rented, the company knows far less about the 
source of the services. Users still pay for what they use, but the company providing the 
services utilizes a much more complex system of infrastructure and software, usually 
involving grid networks that support multiple tasks at once. Thus cloud computing is actually 
more powerful, since it does not rely on any one source. By spreading out the task load, cloud 
computing can be a fast and effective means of computing, often with simplified 
troubleshooting and less maintenance overall. See Figure 4-17.  
Few of the advantages of Cloud Computing Technology are: 
 Automatic upgrades: The greatest advantage of using Cloud computing technology is 
that the company would not have to spend time and resources to upgrade and integrate 
their technology with the greatest and the latest version. 
 Easy Web-services integration: Cloud computing technology is much easier and 
quicker to integrate with a company’s applications (both traditional software and cloud 
computing infrastructure-based), whether third-party or homegrown. 
 No hardware or software to install: The beauty of cloud computing technology is its 
simplicity and in the fact that it requires significantly fewer capital expenditures to get 
up and running.  
 Faster and lower-risk deployment: With Cloud Computing technology applications get 
live in a matter of weeks or at maximum just few months even with extensive 
customization or integration. 
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 Support for deep customizations: The cloud computing infrastructure not only allows 
deep customization and application configuration but also preserves all those 
customizations even during upgrades. 
 
Figure 4-17: Cloud Computing technology. 
By eliminating the problems of traditional application development, cloud computing 
technology frees you to focus on developing business applications that deliver true value to 
your business [26]. 
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4.7.1 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) 
 
Figure 4-18: Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2. 
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) is a web service that provides 
resizable compute capacity in the cloud. It is designed to make web-scale cloud 
computing easier for developers. In Figure 4-18 is displayed the Amazon EC2 logo. 
Amazon EC2’s simple web service interface allows you to obtain and configure 
capacity with minimal friction. It provides you with complete control of your computing 
resources and lets you run on Amazon’s proven computing environment. Amazon EC2 
reduces the time required to obtain and boot new server instances to minutes, allowing you to 
quickly scale capacity, both up and down, as your computing requirements change. Amazon 
EC2 changes the economics of computing by allowing you to pay only for capacity that you 
actually use. Amazon EC2 provides developers the tools to build failure resilient applications 
and isolate themselves from common failure scenarios. 
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Amazon Cpu Cluster Instances 
 Cluster Compute Quadruple Extra Large 23 GB memory, 
 33.5 EC2 Compute Units,  
 1690 GB of local instance storage,  
 64-bit platform,  
 10 Gigabit Ethernet 
Amazon Gpu Cluster Instances 
 Cluster GPU Quadruple Extra Large 22 GB memory,  
 33.5 EC2 Compute Units 
 2 x NVIDIA Tesla “Fermi” M2050 GPUs, 
 1690 GB of local instance storage,  
 64-bit platform,  
 10 Gigabit Ethernet 
By running the pyrit benchmark command: 
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Figure 4-19: The benchmark command. 
We get ~50.000 PMKs/s by speeding only $2.10h. 
After doing the math you can see that an 1,000,000,000 worldlist and  
it will take ~7 hours to complete(~40k pmk/s)= $14.7.  
By running 20 instances(max) it will take 20 min and cost $42 [25].  
4.7.2 CloudCracker 
An Another one online password cracking service for penetration testing is the 
CloudCracker. See Figure 4-20. It is an online password cracking service for penetration 
testers and network auditors who need to check the security of WPA protected wireless 
networks, crack password hashes, or break document encryption. 
 
Figure 4-20: CloudCracker. 
. It is Big, Fast and Cheap as you can run a handshake against 300.000.000 words in 
20 minutes for $17. It provides a range of dictionaries, fine-tuned for the format at hand. We 
save a lot of time if we consider that a “Super-desktop” would need 4 days [26]. 
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Κεφάλαιο 5 Penetration testing- A cluster of CPUs for attacking 
WPA2 protocol by using PYRIT 
5.1 Penetration testing in NITOS Laboratory 
A penetration test, or sometimes pentest, is a software attack on a computer system 
that looks for security weaknesses, potentially gaining access to the computer's features and 
data [31]. In this chapter we try to minimize the time of cracking the WPA2 security protocol 
by using Clusters of nodes. Scenario: “A Station is connected to an AP which uses WPA2 
protocol encryption and an ISSID named “SoniaWPA2”. The password used is “Apollonius”.   
A third node is the attacker which is trying to reveal the password.” The attacker uses the 
aircrack-suite in order to create the .cap file. In our example is named wpa2cap-01.cap (see 
Figure 5-11).  
During our process to reduce the time of cracking we make clusters of nodes. Pyrit 
includes support for clustering multiple machines over the network. This feature was often 
requested as it allows to use hardware much more effectively. 
Pyrit has a command ‘serve‘. A server can use the local hardware to compute for other 
clients. Clients can use multiple servers and each server can support multiple clients 
simultaneously. This is not a distributed database. The clients transfer their workunits to the 
servers and the servers compute the results and send them back. In the case that we have our 
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ESSID added to Pyrit database with our dictionary, we need to batch in order to create the 
PMKS table. In our example we use a 8.3 GB wordlist. 
The next step is to cracking to .cap file. Fistly, we use the attack_db command in our 
experiment. The attack_db command attack an EAPOL-handshake found in  the  packet-
capture  file(s) given  by the option -r using the Pairwise Master Keys stored in the database. 
We start the first attack using a server called a  “Cluster 32-CPU Instance” (see Figure 
5-39).  It is a server which consists of the 32 Cores. During the cracking process it tries 
17839269 PMKs per second and the time-cracking takes only 04 seconds! (See Figure 5-42). 
Although, it is time consuming as regards the banching process. It takes up to four hours.  
Then, in our effort to create a more easy and utilitarian system we decided to look into 
a distributed-node cluster. So, we create a distributed cluster of  five, four, three and two 
nodes (see Figure 5-43).  Each machine is strictly a Linux affair, which is why we're restricted 
to Pyrit. The best part, though, is that it's completely scalable. So, we can add client nodes to 
our master server in order to distribute the workload. We observe that there is no significant 
difference in time by adding extra nodes as in all cases the password is found in less than one 
minute. Although, it is too a time-consuming process as regards the banching process. It takes 
at least up to twelve hours. 
That’s why then we use the passthrough command.  The passthrough option is for not 
using any disk space. The hash's are computed on the fly with a wordlist and once finished 
nothing is saved and no disk space is used. By using a cluster of six nodes we take a 
benchmark of 4950.33 PMKs/s. The attack_passthrough command finds the password in 05 
minutes. See Figure 5-49. The experiment take place in Nitos Laboratory. 
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Nitos is a Network Implementation Testbed Laboratory of the Computer and 
Communication Engineering Department at University of Thessaly. Figure 5-1illustrates the 
logo. The research of the lab focuses on the design, study and implementation of wireless 
schemes and their performance in the real environment.  
 
Figure 5-1: A Network Implementation Testbed Laboratory 
A testbed (also "test bed") is a platform for conducting rigorous, transparent, and 
replicable testing of scientific theories, computational tools, and new technologies. The term 
is used across many disciplines to describe experimental research and new product 
development platforms and environments [29].  
We used the outdoor nodes for our penetration testing. See Figure 5-2. The new 
version of outdoor nodes are equipped with 802.11a/b/g and 802.11a/b/g/n wireless interfaces. 
They also feature 2-core Intel cpus, new generation solid state drives and usb web cameras. 
Last but not least, each node is equipped with light, temperature and humidity sensors.  
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Figure 5-2: Outdoor nodes 
Specifications:
Motherboard Features two Gigabit network interfaces and supports two wireless interfaces
CPU CPU Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 2,26 GHz
RAM 2G DDR3
Wireless Interfaces Atheros 802.11a/b/g & Atheros 802.11a/b/g/n (MIMO)
Chassis Manager 
card NITlab CM card
Storage Solid state drive
Power Supply 350 Watt mini-ATX
Antennas Multi-band 5dbi , operates both on 2.4Ghz & 5Ghz
Pigtails High quality pigtails (UFL to RP-SMA)
Table 5-1: Specifications of the Outdoor nodes.
We made an AP node with the IP 192.168.1.1 which is using the WPA2 protocol. The 
ssid is named “ SoniaWPA2” and the wpa passphrase is “Apollonius”. Figure 5-4 illustrates 
this. The configuration is the following: 
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Figure 5-3: The AP node. 
Next, we made a Station node with the IP 192.168.1.2 which communicates with the 
AP node as Figure 5-4 shows. 
 
Figure 5-4: The Station node. 
At a third node with the IP 192.168.1.3 we have installed the  Airmong suite tool. This 
is illustrated in Figure 5-5.  
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Figure 5-5: The node with the  Airmong suite tool. 
5.2 Airmong suite for .cap file  
We need to identify the MAC address of the target access point, to do that we would 
require airmong-ng, which is included in the aircrack suite, which in turn is one of the 
programs included in the operating system used i.e. Backbox. First of all, the wireless card, 
card has to be switched to monitor mode, enabling us to scan the network, and obtain relevant 
information.   
1. Identify Network Interfaces: The “iwconfig” tool provides information about 
the available network adapters, sample output is provided below in Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-6: Identify Network Interfaces. 
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2. Put adapter in monitor mode, and scan for networks: airmon-ng is run against 
the adapter, subsequently putting the adapter in monitor mode, so as to 
facilitate information gathering. This is illustrated in Figure 5-7. 
 
Figure 5-7: Monitor mode. 
3. “airodump-ng mon0” will then be run on this to scan for networks: 
 
Figure 5-8: Scan for networks. 
The information in Figure 5-8 provides information about the wireless networks    
available, for this step all that is needed are the SSID, and BSSID of the access point, and the 
MAC address of a connected client. With the information obtained in the preceding step we 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
88 
know the SSID of the network is: SoniaWPA2, it is on channel 9, and the BSSID is: 
E4:CE:8F:68:72:30.   
4. An airodump capture is initiated, this dumps the packets sent to the access 
point into a specified filed, and these packets will include the WPA2 
authentication handshake. The command is: “airodump-ng –c 9 --write 
wp2acapture --bssid E4:CE:8F:68:72:30 wlan0”. Output provided by the 
command is shown in Figure 5-9.  
 --bssid is the MAC address of the AP. 
 wpa2capture is the name of the file where packets will be dumped.    
 
Figure 5-9: Airodump command. 
Figure 5-10 illustrates the traffic on the network. 
 
Figure 5-10: Force traffic on a network. 
5. The following method is used to force traffic on a network and to de-
authenticate a client from an accesspoint, forcing them to re-authenticate 
leading to a successful WPA handshake. Type : ” aireplay-ng –deauth 5 –a 
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E4:CE:8F:68:72:30 –c 7c:c3:a1:a8:0b:ca –e SoniaWPA2 –ignore-negative-one 
wlan0″. 
 
A deauthentication attack is run against an already connected client. This forces it to 
re-join the network, and subsequently the WPA handshake packets are dumped into the 
airodump file.  
The syntax, and output is provided in figure 5-11: 
• 5 is the number of times the attack is to be carried out.  
• -c specifies the MAC address of the targeted client. 
Finally, we have the wpa2cap-01.cap file as we can see in Figure 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-11: The wpa2cap-01.cap file. 
5.3 PYRIT 
Pyrit takes a step ahead in attacking WPA-PSK and WPA2-PSK, the protocol that 
today de-facto protects public WIFI-airspace. The project’s goal is to estimate the real-world 
security provided by these protocols. 
From time to time Pyrit get's packed into stable packages. In general you should 
download, compile and install these source-code packages. As it is illustrated in Figure 5-12. 
As you can see we have installed pyrit-0.4.0.tar.gz up to six outdoor nodes.  
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Figure 5-12: Installing pyrit-0.4.0.tar.gz.  
5.3.1 Make sure that pyrit works 
There are a few small tests to run and see if Pyrit is working properly. First we run the 
command: 
Pyrit list_cores 
The output is shown in Figure 5-13. 
 
Figure 5-13: See if Pyrit is working properly. 
You can see the CPU-Cores that are available. There will be more on that feature later  
by making the cluster. Then, we run the command: 
Pyrit eval 
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The output is shown in Figure 5-14. 
 
Figure 5-14: Pyrit eval command. 
As you can see you are connected to storage with success but there are no passwords. 
5.3.2 Analyzing Packets with Pyrit 
Assuming that you have already successfully received your 4 way handshake, lets 
proceed to use pyrit to analyze the packets before attempting to crack it. To do this open a 
terminal and type: 
 pyrit -r <your.cap> analyze 
This is illustrated in Figure 5-15. 
 
Figure 5-15: Analyze the packets. 
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Pyrit has successfully analyzed the captured file and found one Access Point with 
BSSID E4:CE:8F:68:72:30 and ESSID ‘SoniaWPA2’ and a Station communicating with that 
AccessPoint. 
5.3.3 Pyrit Password Preparation 
Pyrit can store ESSIDs, passwords/passphrases and their corresponding Pairwise 
Master Keys in a database. This is a very useful function as it is doing the major task of pre-
computing tables of Pairwise Master Keys and ESSIDs. This will vastly reduce the time 
needed to guess the password. 
Firstly to upload all our password list to pyrit database, type :  
pyrit -i <dictionary file> import_passwords. 
The output is shown in Figure 5-16. 
 
Figure 5-16: Pyrit Password Preparation. 
We have used a 8 gb dictionary named openlibrary downloaded from 
http://human0id.net/dicts/openlibrary/openlibrary_wordlist.7z. Make sure you have a strong 
password list with as many entries as possible.  
Then by typing pyrit eval, you can see the number of passwords as it is shown is 
Figure 5-17. 
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Figure 5-17: The number of passwords 
Creating tables with pyrit involves a few extra steps but you will have created a table 
which can be used over and over as long as the essid of the AP is the same. 
First we add our essid by typing, see Figure 5-18: 
 
Figure 5-18: Create ESSID “SoniaWPA2”. 
Now that we have the ESSID and passwords uploaded into our database, lets batch 
process them. This means that pyrit will take our ESSID “SoniaWPA2” and combine it with 
each passphrase in the word list. It will then store the computed corresponding Pairwise 
Master Keys, which we will use later to assist us in cracking the password. Run the command: 
pyrit –e SoniaWPA2 batch 
The output is shown in Figure 5-19. 
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Figure 5-19: Batch  command. 
Finally, by using the eval command we can see the number of the Pairwise Master 
Keys. The output is shown in Figure 5-20. 
 
Figure 5-20: Eval command. 
5.3.4 Configuration of Server – Clients 
Pyrit includes support for clustering multiple machines over the network. This feature 
was often requested as it allows to use hardware much more effectively. 
Pyrit has a command ‘serve‘. A server listens for connections on port 19935 and can 
use the local hardware to compute for other clients. Clients can use multiple servers and each 
server can support multiple clients simultaneously. This is not a distributed database. The 
clients transfer their workunits to the servers and the servers compute the results and send 
them back.  
On the server the configuration file ~/.pyrit/config should look like the Figure 5-21: 
 
Figure 5-21: The configuration file on the server node. 
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The IPs of the slave- clients  are listed as the rcp_knownclients. 
On each client the configuration file ~/.pyrit/config should look like the Figure 5-22: 
 
Figure 5-22: The configuration file on client node. 
Where the IP “10.0.1.24” is the IP of the master-server. 
After having the above configuration file on all our machines, four at this example, we 
run in each slave the command: 
pyrit serve 
The output is shown in Figure 5-23. 
 
Figure 5-23: Run in each slave the Pyrit serve command. 
Now, from the Master we can test our newly built cluster using pyrit's benchmark 
option. This will show use the occupancy of the cores in a percentage value and it will give us 
a rough estimate of the amount of  PMK/second than pyrit will be using.   
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Figure 5-24: Testing our newly built cluster. 
As we can see in Figure 5-24 there is a new content named “ Network-Clients” which 
is the CPUs of the slaves. In this tutorial we used four slaves. 
If we switch to each slave while running the benchmark, we can see that each slave is 
connected. This is illustrated in Figure 5-25. 
 
Figure 5-25: A five-node cluster. 
Now, by running the “pyrit batch” command we can see in Figure 5-26 that the 
batching process is faster as we have 11507 PMKs per second. 
 
     Figure 5-26: Batching on “SoniaWPA2” with 11507 PMKs per 
second. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
97 
5.3.5 Using a SQL-database as storage 
Using a SQL-database instead of the filesystem will give you some benefits: 
 Real ACID-compliance, backup- and load-balancing-features. 
 Multiple Pyrit-clients can operate on the same database at the same time over the 
network. 
 Meta- and binary-data are stored independent of each other, making the database 
easier to query and operate on. 
Pyrit uses SQLAlchemy and can therefor use all kinds of SQL-databases for it's 
internal storage mechanism: SQLite has all the benefits described above (except the network-
functionality), MySQL and PostgreSQL require some setup but provide more features and 
better scaling.  
Using a database as storage is extremely easy - all you got to do is to provide an 
alternative connection-string instead of 'file://' that Pyrit uses by default. In the following 
example, we use a  PostgreSQL object-relational database management system. See Figure 5-
27 , Figure 5-28 and Figure 5-29. 
1. Install and start the postgresql-server. Install sqlalchemy and psycopg2. 
2.  Switch to user postgres (‘su – postgres‘). 
 
Figure 5-27: Install and start the postgresql-server. 
3. Start the interactive shell  (‘psql template1‘)  
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Figure 5-28: Start the interactive shell. 
 
Create a new user (‘create user pyrit”) and a new database (‘create database pyrit with password 
“kyp”) 
 
Figure 5-29: Create a new user (“pyrit”) and a new database (database pyrit with password “kyp”) 
4. Edit /etc/postgresql/9.1/main/pg_hba.conf  file, as it is shown in Figure 5-30. 
 
Figure 5-30: Commnad edit  the pg_hba.conf  file. 
and add the lines “host  pyrit  pyrit  127.0.0.1/32  trust” and “host  pyrit  pyrit  
10.0.1.18/22  trust” to the top of the file as it is shown in Figure 5-31. This allows 
password-less access to the pyrit database on the local network. 
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Figure 5-31: Edit  the pg_hba.conf  file. 
 Restart the postgresql-server. See Figure 5-32. 
 
Figure 5-32: Restart the postgresql-server.  
5. Edit /etc/postgresql/9.1/main/ postgresql.conf  file as it is shown in Figure 5-
33. 
 
Figure 5-33: Command edit the postgresql.conf  file. 
Edit listen_addresses line and add the server’s IP. This is illustrated in Figure 5-34. 
 
Figure 5-34: Edit the postgresql.conf  file. 
6. Edit the server’s storage in order to communicate with the database, as it is 
shown in Figure 5-35. 
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Figure 5-35: Edit the server’s storage in order to communicate with the database 
7. Edit the client’s storage in order to communicate with the database, as it is 
shown in Figure 5-36. 
 
Figure 5-36: Edit the client’s storage in order to communicate with the database. 
Now, as we can see in Figure 537 we can upload all our password list to our pyrit 
database. 
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Figure 5-37: Upload the password list to the database. 
5.4 Cracking With Pyrit 
As we have seen before the use of aicrack- suite find the password up to 23 minutes 
(Table 5-2). During our process to reduce the time of cracking we benefit of the advantages of  
cloud computing by using clusters of nodes. Pyrit includes support for clustering multiple 
machines over the network. So, we can add client nodes to our master server in order to 
distribute the workload. Then we use the pyrit command attack_passthrough and the 
attack_db command on a different number of nodes. Firstly, we test the attack_db command 
into a distributed-node cluster. We use a cluster of two, three, four and five nodes. We 
observe that it is a time-consuming process as regards the banching process. So, next we test 
it on dedicated server of 32 Cores. Then, in our effort to make a more flexible system, free 
from the need of memory space we use the passthrough command. We test the 
attack_passthrough as on a distributed cluster as on a dedicated server. Let's see them in detail 
in our experiment below. 
Aicrack suite 
Time(min) 23 
Table 5-2: Time of Cracking by using aicrack- suite. 
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5.4.1 Attack_db 
In the case that we have our ESSID added to Pyrit database with our dictionary, we 
need to batch in order to create the PMKS table.  This is a time-consuming process as it takes 
many hours.  
The attack_db command attack an EAPOL-handshake found in the packet-capture  
file(s) given  by the option -r using the Pairwise Master Keys stored in the database. The 
options -b and -e can be used to specify the Access-Point to attack; it  is  picked  
automatically if both options are omitted.  The password is written to  the  filename given by 
the option -o if specified. For example:  
pyrit -r test.pcap -e MyOtherNetwork attack_db 
Only Pairwise Master Keys that have been computed previously and are stored in the 
database are used by attack_db. 
To begin the assault on  target with our newly modified database, we  type : 
 pyrit –r <yourfile.cap> attack_db . 
The output is shown in Figure 5-38. 
 
Figure 5-38: Assault on  target. 
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5.4.1.1 Distributed Cluster 
In our effort to create a easy and utilitarian system we decided to look into a 
distributed-node cluster. We have created a distributed cluster of  five, four, three and two 
nodes. See Figure 5-39.  Each machine is strictly a Linux affair, which is why we're restricted 
to Pyrit. The best part, though, is that it's completely scalable. So, we can add client nodes to 
our master server in order to distribute the workload. 
. 
Figure 5-39: A cluster of five nodes. 
We observe in the following Table 5-3 that there is no significant difference in time by adding 
extra nodes as in all cases the password is found in less than one minute.  
 NUMBER OF NODES  (CLUSTER) 

























2696.8 PMKs per 
second 
Crack(sec) 37 sec 36 sec 35 sec 32 sec 
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Table 5-3: A comparative table between clusters with different numbers of nodes. 
Each node instance is armed with a 1 Gb Ethernet link.  This is what bottlenecks the 
cracking speed. Remember that a single ASCII character consumes one byte. So, as you start 
cracking longer passwords, the master server has to send more data to the clients. Worse still, 
the clients have to send the processed PMK/PTK back to the master server. As the network 
grows, the number of passwords each additional node processes goes down, resulting in 
diminishing returns [30]. The worst part of the process is that it is a time-consuming process 
as regards the banching process. It takes at least up to twelve hours. That’s why then we test 
the passthrough command. 
5.4.1.2 A “Cluster 32-CPU Instance” 
Secondly, free from the need of the communication among master and slaves, we 
made our attack using a dedicated server called a  “Cluster 32-CPU Instance” (see Figure 5-
40).  It  consists of the following feautures: 
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Figure 5-40: The “Cluster 32-CPU Instance”.
 96 GB RAM 
 32 Cores 
 64-bit platform 
 I/O performance: 1 gigabit Ethernet 
 API name: HP ProLiant BL460c Gen9 Server Blade 
As we can see in the following figure 5-41 we are able to hit up to 14159.3 PMKs/s.  
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Figure 5-41: Hit up to 14159.3 PMKs/s. 
We install Pyrit 0.4.0 on our server and we import our dictionary “allwordlists.txt”. 
Pyrit automatically filters passwords that are not suitable for WPA(2)-PSK and also sorts out 
duplicates when populating the database for the obvious reasons.  Now with our ESSID “ 
SoniaWPA2” and some words in our database lets batch-process them. Pyrit will take our 
ESSID “SoniaWPA2” and combine with each passphrase in the word list, compute the 
corresponding Pairwise master Keys and simply store them. This is illustrated in Figure 5-42. 
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Figure 5-42: Compute the corresponding Pairwise master Keys and store them. 
The banching process takes up to four hours. After the batch is done 
we can use our new database to recover the password.  
 
Figure 5-43: Recover the password. 
It takes only 04 seconds! “Tried 45453389 PMKs so far (50.4%); 17839269 PMKs per 
second’ .  See Figure 5-43. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
108 
5.4.2 Attack_passthrough  
The second method of attack to the cap file is by using the the attack_passthrough 
command. It attack  an  EAPOL-handshake  found  in the packet-captur file(s) given by the 
option -r using the  passwords  read from the file given by the option -i.  The options -b and -
e can be used to specify the Access-Point to attack;  it  is  picked automatically if both options 
are omitted. The  password is written to the filename given by  the  option  -o if specified.  
For example:  
pyrit -r test.pcap -b 00:de:ad:be:ef:00 \ -i words.txt attack_passthrough 
The passthrough option is for not using any disk space. The hash's are computed on 
the fly with a wordlist and once finished nothing is saved and no disk space is used. We test it 
also  in a cluster of two, three, four, five and six nodes.  
5.4.2.1 1 node 
By using one node we take a benchmark of 1042.14 PMKs/s total. The 
attack_passthrough command finds the password “Apollonius”  in 32 minutes. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5-44. 
 
Figure  5-39: Running the attack_passthrough command in one node. 
The actual results are shown in the following Table 5-4: 
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 1 NODE 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 1042.14 PMKs/s total -- 
Network- Clients 0 PMKs/s -- 
av. PMKs/ sec 1479 PMKs per second -- 
Crack(min) 32 -- 
Table 5-4: Features by running the attack_passthrough command in one node. 
5.4.2.2 Cluster of 2 nodes 
By using a cluster of two nodes we take a benchmark of 1672.5 PMKs/s total. The 
attack_passthrough command finds the password in 16 minutes. The results are illustrated in 
Figure 5-45. 
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Figure 5-40: Running the attack_passthrough command in a cluster of two nodes. 
The actual results are shown in the following Table 5-5: 
 NUMBER OF NODES 2 (CLUSTER) 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 1672.46 PMKs/s total 1722.42 PMKs/s total 
Network- Clients 702.1  PMKs/s 715.7 PMKs/s 
av. PMKs/ sec 2598 PMKs per second 2594 PMKs per second 
Crack(min) 16 16 
Table 5-5: Features by running the “attack_passthrough” command in two nodes. 
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By comparing the two tables we can see that the benchmarking process goes from 1042.14 
PMKs/s total to 1672.46 PMKs/s total. While the computing power increases with 702.1  
PMKs/s by adding the extra node.  Αs can be seen there is a significant difference in time-
cracking as it almost stays in half! 
5.4.2.3 Α Cluster of 3 nodes 
By using a cluster of three nodes we take a benchmark of 2618.40 PMKs/s total, see 
Figure 5-46.  
 
Figure 5-41: Running the attack_passthrough command in a cluster of three nodes. 
The actual results are shown in the following Table 5-6: 
 NUMBER OF NODES 3 (CLUSTER) 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 2618.40 PMKs/s total 2565.27 PMKs/s total 
Network- Clients 1365.2 PMKs/s 1311.7 PMKs/s 
av. PMKs/ sec 3691 PMKs per second 3560 PMKs per second 
Crack(min) 10 10.5 
Table 5-6: Features by running the “attack_passthrough” command in three nodes. 
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By comparing the Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 we can see that the benchmarking process 
goes from 1672.46 PMKs/s total to 2618.40 PMKs/s total. While the computing power 
increases up to  1365.2 PMKs/s by adding the extra node. While we would expect the time 
cracking respectively to become half, this is reduced to 10 minutes. That’s why the clients 
have to send the processed PMK/PTK back to the master server.  
5.4.2.4 Α Cluster of 4 nodes 
The benchmark of four nodes is 3240.61 PMKs/s total, as it is shown in Figure 5-47..  
 
Figure 5-42: Running the attack_passthrough command in a cluster of four nodes. 
The actual results are shown in the following Table 5-7: 
 NUMBER OF NODES 4 (CLUSTER) 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 3240.61 PMKs/s total 3600.78 PMKs/s total 
Network- Clients 1969.2  PMKs/s 2084.2 PMKs/s 
av. PMKs/ sec 4825 PMKs per second 4640  PMKs per second 
Crack(min) 8 8 
Table 5-7: Features by running the “attack_passthrough” command in four nodes. 
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By comparing the Table 5-6 and Table 5-7 we can see that the benchmarking process 
goes from 2618.40 PMKs/s total to 3240.61 PMKs/s total. While the computing power 
increases up to  1969.2  PMKs/s by adding the extra node. While the time cracking is reduced 
only to 08 minutes. Here, also, the results of time cracking  is not what we expected. We 
observe that the time decreases but it does not decreases respectively as the benchmark 
feature increases.  
5.4.2.5 Α Cluster of 5 nodes 
By using a cluster of five nodes as we can see in Figure 5-48 we take a benchmark of 
4213.9 PMKs/s total.  
 
Figure 5-43: Running the attack_passthrough command in a cluster of five nodes. 
The actual results are shown in the following Table 5-8: 
 NUMBER OF NODES 5 (CLUSTER) 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 4266.15 PMKs/s total 4149.69 PMKs/s total 
Network- Clients 2601.9 PMKs/s 2543.6  PMKs/s 
av. PMKs/ sec 5871 PMKs per second 5588 PMKs per second 
Crack(min) 6 6 
Table 5-8: Features by running the “attack_passthrough” command in five nodes. 
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By comparing the Table 5-6 and Table 5-7 we can see that the benchmarking process 
goes from 3240.61 PMKs/s total to 4266.15 PMKs/s total. While the computing power 
increases up to  2601.9 PMKs/s by adding the extra node. The time cracking is reduced only 
to 06 minutes. That’s why the clients have to send the processed PMK/PTK back to the 
master server. Which is a time-consuming process.  
5.4.2.6 Α Cluster of 6 nodes 
By using a cluster of six nodes we take a benchmark of 4950.33 PMKs/s. The 
attack_passthrough command finds the password in 5 minutes. See Figure 5-49. 
 
Figure 5-44: Running the attack_passthrough command in a cluster of six nodes. 
The actual results of two tests are shown in the following Table 5-9:  
 NUMBER OF NODES 6 (CLUSTER) 
 1η  test 2η  test 
benchmark 4499.12 PMKs/s total 4950.33 PMKs/s total 
Network- Clients 3160.7 PMKs/s 3445.2 PMKs/s 
av. PMKs/ sec 7015 PMKs per second 6877 PMKs per second 
Crack(min) 5 5 
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Table 5-9: Features by running the “attack_passthrough” command in six nodes. 
By comparing the Table 5-8 and Table 5-9 we can see that the benchmarking process 
goes from 4266.15 PMKs/s total to 4499.12 PMKs/s total.  We observe as the number of 
nodes increases the growth of benchmark decreases. The computing power increases up to  
1969.2  PMKs/s by adding the extra node. While the time cracking is reduced only to 06 
minutes. This is what bottlenecks the cracking speed. Remember that a single ASCII character 
consumes one byte. So, as you start cracking longer passwords, the master server has to send 
more data to the clients. Worse still, the clients have to send the processed PMK/PTK back to 
the master server. As the network grows, the number of passwords each additional node 
processes goes down, resulting in diminishing returns [30]. However by comparing this 
method  to the other two methods of cracking it is the more effective than attack_db in the 
case we do not have disk space and it is less time-consuming than the aicrack –suite method.   
5.4.2.7 A “Cluster 32-CPU Instance” 
Secondly, we made our attack using a dedicated server called a  “Cluster 32-CPU 
Instance” (see Figure 5-50).  It  consists of the following feautures: 
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Figure 5-50: The “Cluster 32-CPU Instance”.
 96 GB RAM 
 32 Cores 
 64-bit platform 
 I/O performance: 1 gigabit Ethernet 
 API name: HP ProLiant BL460c Gen9 Server Blade 
As we can see in the following figure 5-51 we are able to hit up to 14159.3 PMKs/s.  
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Figure 5-51: Hit up to 14159.3 PMKs/s. 
We install Pyrit 0.4.0 on our server. 
It takes only 02:25 minutes! “Tried 2080104 PMKs so far (50.4%);”.  
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Κεφάλαιο 6 Conclusion 
6.1 CPU and Memory Usage 
As we have seen with the use of six nodes the time-cracking is quite effective. 
However in a system we are interested in other features such as  the memory usage and  the 
cpu usage.  It's important to configure monitoring and alerting so that you're aware of 
potential issues before they become critical enough to negatively impact application 
performance or availability. So, we test the usage of memory each time we add an extra node. 
The results are illustrated in the following Diagram 5-1: 
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We observe that by adding extra nodes in order to create a larger cluster the memory 
usage of the master-client is increased. The largest increase is observed when we are going 
from one to two nodes. Then, we can say that the memory usage is steadily growing by 
adding extra nodes. 
Then, we test the cpu usage each time we add an extra node. 
 
Diagram 6-2: The CPU usage from the master- node by adding extra nodes. 
Unlike we observe in the Diagram 5-2 that the cpu usage from the master – client 
remains constant.  
6.2 Comparison of the attack_db and attack_passthrough command 
The use of a database is a powerful pyrit feature as guessing the password used in a 
WPA(2)-PSK key-negotiation is a computational-intensive task. 
Pyrit can store ESSIDs, passwords/passphrases and their corresponding Pairwise 
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Pairwise Master Keys and ESSIDs. This  dramaticaly reduces the amount of time needed to 
recover/guess this password since the hardest part has been done. 
As we have seen in a cluster, clients can use multiple servers and each server can 
support multiple clients simultaneously. The attack_db command uses PMKS stored in a 
database. During the batch command the database is not distributed. The client transfer their 
workunits to the servers and the servers compute the results and send them back. Bandwidth 
is a problem: 10.000 PMKs/s require about 30 kb/s from the client to the server and about 300 
kb/s from the server to the client. 
For every node we add, the process speeds up by 10 000 to 30 000 PMKs/s. That's 
something not as significant as we expected, but it does demonstrate the effectiveness of 
distributing workloads across more machines that what any one person could procure on their 
own.  
Also, supposing that the banching process is complete, it takes only seconds to reveal 
the password even if we use a cluster of two nodes. 
On the other hand, the passthrough option is for not using any disk space. The hash's 
are computed on the fly with a wordlist and once finished nothing is saved and no disk space 
is used. As a result, it is not as time consuming as the attack_db command as it is free from 
the use of the banching process. 
In the following Diagram 5-3 we see how the benchmark is growing as we add extra 
nodes during the attack_passthrough command: 
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Diagram 6-3: The benchmark during the attack_passthrough command. 
We observe that as we add extra nodes the “benchmark” feature is growing by 300 
PMKs/s to 1.000 PMKs/s. The increase from first node to fifth is by 700 PMKs/s to 1.000 
PMKs/s, that’s why we can say that the increase from first node to fifth node is growing 
linearly. However when we add the sixth node we observe a significant reduction in the 
“benchmark” feature! 
Next we test the “av. PMKs/sec”  feature. In the following Diagram 5-4 we see how 
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Diagram 6-4: The “av. PMKs/sec” during the attack_passthrough command. 
We observe that as we add extra nodes the “av. PMKs/sec” is growing by 1000 
PMKs/s to 1.200 PMKs/s. By observing the diagram we can say that the increase from fisrt 
node to sixth node is growing linearly. 
At this point it is worth noting that the strength of the dictionary plays a huge factor in 
cracking the password. The dictionary list we uploaded into the database is consisted of  
simple dictionaries downloaded off the internet up to 8.3 gb. We can load as many as we can 
into our database, as we can use them in the future for other ESSIDs. We will just have to 
Batch them according to the new ESSIDS.  
In the following Diagram 5-5 we see how the “Network-Clients” feature is growing as 
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Diagram 6-5: The “Network- Clients” during the attack_passthrough command. 
We observe that the ““Network-Clients” feature is increasing by 500 PMKs/s to 700 
PMKs/s. By observing the diagram we can say that the increase from fisrt node to fifth node 
is growing linearly. However, the growth drops to 500 PMKs/s  as we go from the fifth to the 
sixth node.  
Finally, we test the “time-cracking” feature. In the following Diagram 5-6 we see how 
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Diagram 6-6: The “Time of cracking” during the attack_passthrough command. 
By adding a second node we observe that the “time cracking” decreases to 16 minutes 
from 32 minutes. This decrease is expected considering that the increase in the ““Network-
Clients” feature doubles.  By adding a third node the “time cracking” decreases to 10 minutes 
from 16 minutes. However, we would expect to reduce to 8 minutes regarding the increase of  
“Network-Clients” feature. By adding a forth node the “time cracking” decreases to 08 
minutes from 10 minutes. However, we would expect to reduce to 05 or 06 minutes regarding 
the increase of  “Network-Clients” feature. Then, by adding a fifth node the “time cracking” 
decreases to 06 minutes from 08 minutes. However, we would expect to reduce to 04 minutes 
regarding the increase of  “Network-Clients” feature. Finally, by adding a fifth node the “time 
cracking” decreases to 05 minutes from 06 minutes. It is a very small decrease considering 
the corresponding increase of the “Network-Clients” feature.  
The diagram 5-6 illustrates a significant, non-linear reduction of time by adding extra 
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Finally we have a comparative chart (Diagram 5-7) between “Network-Clients” and 
“Time-cracking” feature as we add extra nodes during the attack_passthrough command: 
 
Diagram 6-7: A comparative chart between “Network-Clients” and “Time of cracking”. 
As we mentioned the ““Network-Clients” feature is increasing by 500 PMKs/s to 700 
PMKs/s. By observing the diagram we can say that it is almost growing linearly. However, 
the “time-cracking” feature follows a non-linear reduction of time by adding extra nodes in 
cluster. We observe that as we increase the number of  nodes as the cutting time decreases.  
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network grows, the number of passwords each additional node processes goes down, resulting 
in diminishing returns.  
6.3 Food for thought 
The protocol WPA / WPA2 as we saw has its weaknesses and it is vulnerable to 
attacks. However we can protect it by using certain measures in order to make it more 
difficult to break the code. We can change the default “essid” with an our, custom essid in 
order to avoid pre-computed rainbow tables attacks. Also the changing it at regular intervals 
reduces the possibility of breakage. If we change the keys regularly or exchange them with 
more difficult keys makes the brute forced attack impossible, as by using a strong key (>9 
characters)  and assuming the current strength of processors the whole process of breaking 
takes many years. Finally, the use of a VPN-client network is the safest solution as the data 
cannot be captured by crackers. 
As far as the supporters of the opposite side in order to improve the speed of breaking 
codes there is a way. We know that the maximum number of characters of a wpa2 password is 
24 bit. Which means that by using an advanced cloud system the whole thing of cracking can 
be a piece of cake. 
As we saw the cloud gives us two superior advantages. Firstly, the large capacity and 
joint management of a database and secondly the speed which is multiplied as the clients in 
cluster grow. A scenario which may reflect the reality in a few years is a public, online service 
WPA cracking system, where users lend the computing power of their systems, by creating a 
vast computational cluster. Next, they can upload the dictionary and the corresponding SSID 
to the colossal database. Considering the size of the cluster the  PMKs are calculated almost 
instantaneously. Οwing to supply their computing power users can enjoy access to the 
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colossal cluster which allows them to attack any wpa / wpa2 network without special 
hardware. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
128 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] Caneill M. and Gilis J. (2012) “Attacks against the WiFi protocols WEP and WPA”, 
OcInternational Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering Website: 
www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 1).  
[2] Sukhija, S. and Gupta, S. (2010) “Wireless Network Security Protocols  A 
Comparative Study”, Mtober. 
[3] Tews, E. (2007) “Attacks on the WEP protocol”,  Diploma thesis Fachgebiet 
Theoretische Informatik.  











Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
129 
[10] Sukhija, S. and Gupta, S. (2012) “Wireless Network Security Protocols  A 
Comparative Study”, International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced 
Engineering. 
[11] Vibhuti, S. (2005) “IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and 




[13] Izhar, M. and SINGH, V.R. (2014) “A Practical Approach for Evaluation of Security 
Methods  of  Wireless Network”, International Journal of Scientific and Research 





[16] Arana, P. (2006) “Benefits and Vulnerabilities of Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)”,  
INFS 612 




Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
130 
[19] WPA/WPA2 Password Security Testing using Graphics Processing Units  Sorin Andrei 
VISAN 




[22] Iqsecur.blogspot : 
http://iqsecur.blogspot.gr/2012/01/building-perfect-wordlist.html 




[25] Groups.google : 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/pyrit/b7APbEHm7gw 








Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly




Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:11:18 EET - 137.108.70.7
